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This thesis is a study of current trends in state-society  relations in Vietnam, in particu-
lar as far as questions of legitimacy  and institutional change are concerned. It departs 
from the observation that Vietnam today  features the coexistence of old and new ele-
ments in the economic, social and political arenas. Focussing on the political realm, it 
argues that Vietnamese mass organizations (MOs) are one of the key  elements of the 
Vietnamese state’s strategy to constrain political opposition, suggesting that they  are 
hybrid organizations featuring both characteristics of civil society and of the state. On 
one hand, MOs have abandoned their main role of conveying ideological propaganda 
to the masses to become social welfare agencies providing a wide range of services to 
their members. On the other hand, they have substantially maintained their subordi-
nate position to the Communist Party and their function of social control over their 
members on behalf of the political elites. This has resulted in a double benefit for the 
state. The first is that the empowerment of MOs and their ability to attract foreign 
funding has successfully eased the social tensions arising from increasing inequalities. 
The second is that the communication and social control structures at its disposal have 
been modernized at little cost and without  granting significant concessions in terms of 
political rights. The paper concludes by assessing the significance of these findings for 
the debate on the nexus between development and democratization, advocating the 







This is a study of change and continuity in Vietnam, of the process through which a 
socialist country of eighty million people has become one of the fastest growing mar-
ket economies in the world without changing its Leninist political system, and of how 
the old and the new have amalgamated into a unique political and social reality. More 
specifically, it is a study of how Vietnamese mass organizations (MOs) fit into this 
dialectic of innovation and persistence. The first section of this chapter introduces the 
two broad approaches towards institutional change that predominate in the literature, 
putting particular emphasis on the so-called Fourth Wave (post-1989) of democratiza-
tion. Section two positions Vietnam within this academic debate, offering an overview 
of recent developments in the country’s economy, society  and politics and assessing 
some examples of theories of institutional change as applied to Vietnam. Section three 
introduces the model of institutional change that will guide this analysis and develops 
its main theoretical concepts, while the last section presents the research question and 
hypotheses, concluding with an outline of the research design and the plan of the fol-
lowing chapters of this thesis.
1
 1.1 Thinking about democratic transitions
 The debate on the emergence of democratic regimes in developing countries has en-
gaged social scientists for decades. Political scientists have provided an array  of ex-
planations of democracy and authoritarianism in the world. Such an extensive and di-
verse literature would require an extended review, but a brief synthesis of two general 
types of explanations is indispensable to introduce the case of Vietnam. Following the 
structure and agency dichotomy, Doorenspleet (2005:2-8) groups explanations of 
post-1989 democratic transitions in two broad categories, structural and actor-oriented 
approaches.1  Structural approaches explain the emergence of democratic regimes 
through overarching structural forces that supposedly shape political dynamics and 
institutional change. Examples of such factors include indicators of economic and so-
cial development, economic growth, political culture, the international strategic envi-
ronment, and historical legacies. This is a diverse paradigm and it  has evolved signifi-
cantly over time, but what unites these studies is the belief that such structural vari-
ables are more important than the specific actions of single individuals or groups. Two 
subsets in particular have emerged as leading frameworks to account for transitions to 
democracy  from a structural perspective, namely modernization theory2  and 
structural-historical approaches.
Modernization theory dates back to American political science of the 1950s, and it has 
since then represented a popular account to explain democratization. This theory ar-
2
1 Note that the two categories should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Several studies combine ele-
ments of both approaches, and the model developed in § 3.2 features both structural and actor-oriented 
factors.
2 It is perhaps more accurate to use the plural form “modernization theories” considering the diversity 
and extent of this literature, but this simplification should be suitable to the introductory purpose of this 
section.  
gues that indicators of socio-economic development like per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) and levels of industrialization, urbanization and education are strong 
predictors of the likelihood of a specific country  to democratize. Observing large sets 
of case studies, early modernization scholars pointed out the high correlation between 
socio-economic development and democracy, and concluded that  a causal mechanism 
between the two could be established. A country  will democratize when a set  of social 
and economic requisites is met, because these factors are the premise for the emer-
gence of democratic values among common people, which in turn leads to the estab-
lishment of democratic institutions.3  This approach posited a universal and linear 
causal relationship between development and democracy, one in which there is a suc-
cession of development stages leading to democratic polities. modernization theory 
today  has evolved in several respects compared to earlier versions, especially in re-
considering its ambition to provide a universal and mono-causal model to explain de-
mocracy,4 but the debate on the predominance of socio-economic development over 
other factors in explaining democratization is far from being concluded.5
Some researchers, however, while accepting the general conclusion that the socio-
economic development of a country  can affect the likelihood of its democratization, 
have criticized modernization theory on the grounds that  it cannot explain when and 
how a democratic transition takes place. They  argue that to understand institutional 
change the specific historical configuration of “power structures” and their evolution 
3
3 Some authors have actually proposed alternative causal mechanisms to explain the correlation, but the 
one identifying democratic values as the crucial intervening factor is probably the most common ver-
sion of modernization theory.
4 see Diamond (1992) for an example of how modernization theory claims have been qualified in im-
portant ways.
5 In a recent article for instance, Epstein et al.  (2006) elaborate new evidence to support the causal link 
between economic development and democracy.
over time must be considered. For example Moore (1966) elaborates on the Marxist 
framework in identifying class relations as the key factor for the emergence of democ-
racy, which in his analysis is linked to the presence of a strong and independent bour-
geoisie. Since then, the emphasis on the role of the middle class as the spearhead of 
democracy  has been the leitmotiv of countless studies in comparative politics. Class 
relations has not been the only structural feature analyzed from this perspective: many 
scholars have tried to explain democratization and institutional change by focusing on 
the changing relations between the state and selected social actors, on the role of the 
state in the international system,6 or on a combination of different factors.7 Similarly, 
some scholars work from a structural perspective that they identify  as the “political 
economy approach” to explain the timing and the terms of democratic transitions. Al-
though they acknowledge the importance of the strategic interaction among political 
players, their approach “focuses on the effects of economic conditions on the prefer-
ences, resources, and strategies of key political actors in the transition ‘game’” (Hag-
gard & Kaufman 1999:76).8
The second paradigm identified by Doorenspleet also features a long academic tradi-
tion that many trace back to a seminal article by Rustow (1970) that advocated the 
need to focus on the study of agency  to explain democratic transitions. From this per-
spective, examining structural factors is at best insufficient, because the actions of in-
dividuals and social groups are neglected. Proponents of this approach argue that that 
4
6 In this respect, dependency theories can also be counted among structural-historical approaches since 
they identify international economic relations (more specifically the global development of capitalism) 
as the source of national institutional settings.
7 For example, Rueschemeyer et al.  (1992) complement their class structure analysis with the study of 
transnational power relations.
8 Note that this path of research is different from economic theories of democratization that offer formal 
models of the strategic interaction among political players.
even under similar structural constraints, the institutional outcomes of transition can 
vary significantly. This is due to the role of agents like social groups and political 
leaders. For these analysts, no account of democratization is complete without refer-
ence to the strategic interaction among this plurality  of players, who are seen as an 
element more independent  and powerful than structural perspectives suggest. In this 
category, two main analytical frameworks can also be distinguished.
The first thread focuses on the bargaining among political elites in periods of political 
transitions. The emergence of democratic institutions is not to trace back to socio-
economic development or democratic values as modernization theory  argues, but only 
to the different configuration of power relations between supporters and opponents of 
the authoritarian regime.9 For example, a popular model developed by O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986) and expressed formally by  Przeworski (1991) argues that  interac-
tions among four groups of actors, namely hard-liners and soft-liners both in the elites 
supporting and opposing the authoritarian regime. The most favorable configuration 
of power for the establishment of democracies, they argue, is that of a substantial 
power balance between supporters and opponents, which encourages a compromise 
between moderates of both sides. So democratization succeeds if the moderate wings 
manage to find an agreement on future institutional arrangements, which often entails 
the marginalization of radicals on both sides.10 
A second perspective contends that the role of mass mobilization is critical in the ex-
planation of institutional outcomes. Interactions among elites are often the source of 
5
9 So from this point of view, democracies can be established even in the absence of genuine democrats 
among the political elites.  
10  This conclusion has been challenged by McFaul (2002) with empirical data from post-communist 
countries.
democratic transitions, but these cannot be understood if one does not acknowledge 
the ability of the masses to influence and constrain elite behavior. Furthermore, the 
negative role attributed to radical agents in elite bargaining theories is also challenged. 
Bermeo (1997, 2003), for instance, mentions several cases in support of her argument 
that mass mobilization, even if usually associated with radical demands of political 
change, can have a decisive and positive role in establishing democratic regimes. The 
discussion of the role of mass mobilization in democratic transitions is often associ-
ated with the study of the emergence of “civil society,” a realm of political action in-
dependent from the state and able to counterbalance and challenge authoritarian re-
gimes. The recent  work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also falls into this second 
group of actor-oriented theories of democratization: it elaborates a simple game theo-
retic model of democratic transition, neglecting intra-elite dynamics in favor of a con-
traposition between pro-status quo elites and masses favoring democratic change. 
1.2  Change  and continuity in Vietnam
The case of Vietnam has also been studied from some of these perspectives. Since the 
first measures of an extensive economic reform program known as doi moi (renova-
tion) were introduced in 1986, several transformations have occurred in this country, 
while many other aspects of Vietnamese economic, social and political life have not. 
This section provides a brief overview of recent developments in Vietnam’s economy, 
society and political system and discusses these changes in the light of the theoretical 
frameworks introduced above.11
6
11 A more throughout analysis of doi moi policies and their consequences in various fields is developed 
in chapter two.
1.2.1 Socio-economic development
 Since the late 1980s Vietnam has been one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. 
After the dramatic years of the economic crises of the mid-1980s that severely af-
fected most countries of the Soviet bloc, Vietnam started growing at a sustained pace. 
While the Vietnamese economy expanded at a modest average yearly rate of 2.0% in 
the years 1985-198812, the figure increased to 7.7% in 1990-1995 and 7.0% during 
1996-2001.13 Recent statistics show an even more rapid economic advancement, with 
the per capita GDP rising in the last five years at  an average annual rate of 8.0%.14 
The structure of the economy has changed significantly  during the last  decade, mov-
ing Vietnam towards industrialization and a growing service sector.15 Structural eco-
nomic reform has been crucially combined with a progressive integration of Vietnam 
into the international financial and trade systems, as the exponential growth of foreign 
direct investment since the 1990s16 and the country’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization in 2007 illustrate.
In the next chapter this thesis assesses the actual extent of doi moi reform, but it is in-
teresting to remark at this stage that structural economic renovation came together 
with sweeping change to income distribution and class formation. According to most 
analyses, Vietnam has been a successful case of poverty reduction. Poverty has fallen 
7
12 Data relating to the growth of GDP per capita at 1994 prices, published by the Vietnamese General 
Statistical Office. Reported in Glewwe (2004:5).
13  This author’s elaboration of World Bank World Economic Indicators,  available online at 
http://www.worldbank.org.
14 Ibid.
15 According to Asian Development Bank (2008) data, the GDP share of the primary sector (agriculture 
and fisheries) has decreased in the last years from 24.5% in 2000 to 20.2% in 2007.
16 The FDI flow increased dramatically from a figure of US$ 363 million in the period 1988-91 to US$ 
1953 for year 2000 alone. Source: Vietnam Ministry of Planning and Investment, reported in Quan 
(2006:61).
sharply from 58% in 1993 to 24.1% in 2004,17 and there has been a radical advance-
ment in a series of social indicators especially in the areas of education and healthcare. 
To be sure, after decades of socialist experiments and forced income equality the 
country  has experienced a significant rise in inequality. However, if this increase is 
compared with that of countries experiencing similar growth rates evidence shows that 
Vietnam’s inequality has increased only moderately.18 Unlike in many other develop-
ing countries, in Vietnam the income polarization often associated with rapid eco-
nomic growth has been largely contained. While the new business elite has been the 
major beneficiary  of growth, a large middle class of small entrepreneurs and urban 
salaried professionals have seized a considerable share of the benefits of the booming 
economy (The Economist 2008).
It is important to stress that Vietnam’s economic system today  still maintains some 
features of the pre-reform era. In particular, the state continues to play a major role 
throughout the economic transition and still holds control of strategic economic 
sectors.19  On one hand, the economic liberalization process has not involved the 
whole economy, and the pace and extent of the introduction of liberalization policies 
seems to have been gradual and closely controlled by  the state. On the other hand, al-
though foreign direct investment has probably been crucial for economic growth,20 the 
state has been the other main player in this success story  thanks to the role of state-
8
17 Asian Development Bank (2008)
18 See Malesky (2008) for a comparison with China, including a discussion of Gini coefficients of the 
two countries.
19 For an example of how the state maintained sizeable control of economic activity, see Gainsbor-
ough’s (2007) study of local authorities in two Vietnamese provinces.
20 See Quan (2006), chapter three.
owned enterprises in supporting industrialization and its strong administrative control 
of external trade, bank lending activities and interest rates (Quan 2000:302-7). 
1.2.2 Social and political liberalization
The radical reorganization of the economic system has paved the way for important 
innovations in social and political arenas. Besides a revolution of class structure, per-
haps the most striking development in the last two decades is the burgeoning of vari-
ous forms of associations throughout the country. According to many accounts, the 
beginning of Vietnamese associational life as it  is known today  dates back to the very 
first years of doi moi, when the restructuring of the state led to the partial reduction of 
the provision of some key social services. Many local associations, often limiting the 
scope of their activities to the village or the neighborhood, were established by people 
(in spite of the absence of a legal framework that allowed it) to compensate the failure 
of local authorities to provide sufficient levels of social welfare (Kerkvliet 2003:3). 
Since this timid beginning, the number of local NGOs has increased exponentially. It 
now includes hundreds of organizations active both at the local and national level in 
virtually  every field,21 giving rise to a lively and still unresolved academic debate on 
the existence of an independent civil society  in Vietnam.22 According to most  observ-
ers, a crucial element in the development of associational life has been the booming 
presence of international NGOs and donors since the early 1990s23 in development 
projects, projects often carried out in close cooperation with MOs and local authori-
9
21 It is not easy to provide a reliable estimate of the actual number of Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs) since 
they are often not registered as legal entities. Attempts at creating a census of the VNGOs world in-
clude Wischermann’s (2003) study that identified 706 civic organizations in the urban areas of Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City alone in year 2000.
22 Chapter four discusses this literature extensively.
23 The VUFO-NGO Resource Center Vietnam lists in its 2007 NGOs directory 367 international NGOs 
registered to work in Vietnam.
ties. These new actors are reputed to have created opportunities for locals to establish 
associations, and introduced a model of how common citizens can engage policy-
makers and improve the life of their own community. However, it  should be reminded 
that this indisputable extension of civil liberties has taken place in an environment 
where the state still places heavy constraints on the freedom of association and ex-
pression of its citizens, especially in the case of political dissent and sensitive areas 
like ethnicity and religion (Freedom House 2008).
The political realm has also witnessed some changes since the beginning of economic 
reform, but it is safe to say that, perhaps not surprisingly, this is a field where Viet-
namese authorities have been particularly  wary of change. Marginal institutional re-
forms towards increased government accountability have been introduced (often in an 
attempt to curb overwhelming corruption), for example, in the experimentation of 
more participatory modes of local governance and in the strengthening of the role of 
the National Assembly  vis-à-vis the Vietnamese Communist Party  (VCP). Neverthe-
less, political stability and continuity with the pre-reform regime in the management 
of power relations have been the major political features during these times of turbu-
lent change (Koh 2004). Most importantly, the transition to a multi-party polity has 
been so far mostly excluded from the public debate in spite of some signs of embry-
onic developments in this direction (Thayer 2008).
1.2.3 Studying Vietnam
The picture of Vietnam emerging from the last paragraphs is that  of a country  that has 
undergone dramatic economic and social changes without letting these transforma-
tions disrupt its political stability and authoritarian polity. Are the theories outlined in 
section one of any  help  in accounting for this discrepancy? Explaining Vietnam’s lack 
10
of democratization is a goal too ambitious for the scope of this paper, since for a satis-
factory answer we would arguably need to look at a host of factors in comparative 
perspective, perhaps with reference to the experience of other countries. The format of 
this work is instead more suitable for a focus on a single case study, and while this 
may  compromise the possibility of a full account of the persistence of authoritarian-
ism in Vietnam, it has the potential to produce a revealing analysis of how this coexis-
tence of old and new has come into being. However, the larger question is still worth 
asking, because it is an ineludible step to relate the analysis elaborated in this paper to 
a broader academic debate.
Vietnam is perhaps a rather straightforward case for modernization theory. As was al-
ready  noted, the impressive advancement in pace and extent of a number of socio-
economic indicators, not to mention the available wealth, has not led to democratic 
institutions. Nevertheless, modernization theorist may contend that with a per capita 
gross national income of US$ 690 in 2006 (Asian Development Bank 2008) Vietnam 
has still a long way to go before reaching the critical income level where democratiza-
tion becomes probable,24 and that democratic values have not yet  developed precisely 
for this reason. However, even though the fact that Vietnam is apparently not an out-
lier in the relationship between socio-economic development and democracy, there is 
no guarantee that it will follow modernization theory patterns in the near future. Em-
pirical evidence of cases that do not fit this paradigm abounds (Przeworski & Limongi 
1997), and Vietnam may be one as well. In other words, the power of modernization 
theory  to analyze social and political change in countries where the levels of both de-
11
24 Przeworski & Limongi (1997) for example discuss the validity of the critical per capita income level 
of US$ 4,115.
velopment and democracy are comparatively low is arguably  weak, since such coun-
tries fall into an area about which this model cannot say much.
 Fforde and De Vylder (1996) offer a much more detailed account of how such rapid 
socio-economic development has come about. They have studied the institutional 
changes in doi moi applying a political economy perspective, remarking that eco-
nomic and institutional renovation is to be understood as a bottom-up process origi-
nating in the independent economic activities of a number of actors rather than from a 
state initiative (Fforde and De Vylder 1996:3-10). From this angle, the patterns of 
economic rents and resource appropriation are identified as the source of major shifts 
in economic policy  and other areas (Fforde 2002). While this line of research is a rich 
and interesting account of the evolution of economic incentives of individual actors, it 
tends to portray a misleading picture of a passive and weak state that merely reacts to 
economic change, a view that contrasts markedly with the opinion of most analysts of 
today’s Vietnam. 
Gainsborough (2002) has attempted to go beyond an analysis of socio-cultural devel-
opment, and following the tradition of Moore (1966) and Ruetschemeyer et al. (1992), 
has performed a class analysis to explain the lack of democratization in Vietnam. In 
particular, he focuses on the role of the middle class as an active force of democratiza-
tion, and observes that the lack of an independent bourgeoisie from the state is key. 
Although this perspective appears to be more illuminating than modernization theory, 
it does not offer persuasive reasons why the middle class, if it became more independ-
ent from the state (or perhaps simply bigger), would push for democratic changes. 
Some may observe that since reform policies of late have greatly benefited the middle 
12
class, the incentives to engage in conflict with ruling elites over regime change would 
be remote since the marginal benefits are limited. 
Other authors have departed from class analysis to examine more broadly the relations 
between the state and social groups, believing that  this is the key to account for the 
current institutional outlook in Vietnam. Kerkvliet  (2001:242-5) identifies three ap-
proaches. According to the dominant state approach, the party-state is a powerful and 
pervasive institution able to control and shape Vietnamese society  from the national 
center to the village level, thus preventing the formation of critical and truly  autono-
mous social organizations. The mobilizational corporatism approach acknowledges 
the possibility of social forces to influence policy making, but only within existing 
institutions dominated by  the state, an interaction that in fact perpetuates the authori-
tarian political system. Finally, the dialogue perspective offers a less unitary and 
mighty view of the state, emphasizing regional variations in state-society relations and 
the fact that independent centers of power exist and have had the ability  to influence 
political elites outside traditional institutional channels.
As far as the actor-oriented approaches of elite bargaining and civil society are con-
cerned, the scholarship  on Vietnam has not developed significantly. On one hand, the 
country  is largely  absent from the literature on the fourth wave of post-Soviet democ-
ratization, where theories of elite bargaining have been applied with particular zeal.25 
This is not  surprising since a vocal anti-regime elite has not yet materialized, and 
genuine political liberalization measures have not been taken into serious considera-
tion by  the current elites. On the other hand, mass mobilization as a challenge to the 
political status quo has not taken place either. There have been indeed several episodes 
13
25 See for example Przeworski (1991).
of popular unrest in rural areas throughout  the country,26 but to this author’s knowl-
edge in none of them demands of systematic political change have arisen. Protesters 
have mostly targeted individual corrupt officials and their abuse of power in fields 
such as land rights, without questioning the monopoly  of the political power of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP).
We thus witness a situation where not only  the middle class is not challenging the 
state for political change, but other social strata that the literature identifies as having 
an interest in democratization (like rural masses and the working class) are not doing 
it either. Why? This paper departs from the observation that the high level of legiti-
macy enjoyed by the VCP is a central element to understand the absence of organized 
open opposition in Vietnam.27 It  tries to go beyond the generic claim that such a wide-
spread legitimacy can be explained through the good performance of the Vietnamese 
authorities in securing economic growth and distributing its benefits with equity. In an 
attempt to provide a more detailed analysis, it  calls for the need to look at how the 
state has been actually  dealing with old and new actors introduced by economic and 
social liberalization. Although a “dominant state” perspective would point at the re-
pressive capacity of the state to account for the lack of pro-democracy  movements, 
this paper suggests that a more convincing explanation can be found in the way in 
which political elites have been crafting consensus around their exclusive political 
leadership, and it contends that MOs have been a crucial factor in the state’s attempt 
to secure political continuity in times of sweeping economic and social change. 
14
26 The rural uprisings in Thai Binh and Lam Dong provinces in 1997 (Salemink 2003:18) are examples 
of such episodes.
27  The assumption that the VCP enjoys high levels of legitimacy is actually a controversial one. The 
paper will analyze this issue in chapter three, to substantiate this claim making reference both to avail-
able empirical surveys on public opinion and to academic studies on the subject.
1.3 State-society relations in Vietnam
This section defines the theoretical framework of this study. Before outlining detailed 
research hypotheses and a research design, three steps are necessary. The first identi-
fies legitimacy  as a central feature of the persistence and change of political systems, 
and explains why such a path is more promising than only looking at the state’s capac-
ity  to coerce. The second is to provide a model of state-society relations in Vietnam 
that illustrates the role of both structural changes and of legitimacy in shaping rela-
tions among social actors and the state. The third is to support the choice of the mobi-
lizational corporatism approach to analyze political legitimacy in Vietnam today and 
to introduce MOs as the object of this study. 
1.3.1 Politics of legitimacy
One can understand political legitimacy as the “belief in the rightfulness of a state, in 
its authority  to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of 
fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral authority, because 
citizens believe that they ought to obey” (Barker 1990:11). For state-society relations 
analysis, legitimacy is of central importance because it is closely linked to political 
outcomes and the behavior of both individuals and social groups. This relationship 
basically  works through two channels (Suchman 1995:575-7). First, legitimacy affects 
the behaviors of individuals: they  are more likely to supply  resources and contribute to 
the persistence or growth of an institution they perceive as legitimate. The second is 
that it  influences how people understand an institution, and therefore it  impacts the 
extent of the criticism and opposition towards an institution. For this reason, the gen-
15
eration of consensus is arguably  as important as coercion in explaining why an 
authoritarian polity persists, changes or democratizes.
In Vietnam the legitimacy of the Socialist Republic has primarily ideological roots, in 
the tradition of both nationalism and communism. On one hand, the party  had a cru-
cial leadership  role in the fight against the French colonial administration during the 
First Indochina War, and has since then enjoyed credit for securing the independence 
and sovereignty of the nation (Vasavakul 1995:261-3), a position strengthened after 
victorious wars against the USA, Cambodia and China. On the other hand, as in all 
socialist systems, the legitimacy  of the states stems directly  from the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine of the party as the leader of the proletarian revolution, a privileged status that 
is legalized in constitutions that grant the party the role of exclusive representative of 
the population. However, another basis of legitimacy  does not rest upon symbolic val-
ues but on a more pragmatic dimension of performance. A political system, to be per-
ceived as legitimate, needs to make a proper use of power to provide concrete out-
comes in terms of goods and services that its citizens see as desirable. In socialist sys-
tems like Vietnam, where such benefits have not included political and civil rights (or 
actually rights of any  kind), social and economic performance has been crucial for the 
legitimacy  of the political system.28  In particular the state, besides enforcing the 
communist imperative of social equality, granted to its citizens a wide range of social 
welfare services at no monetary cost, according to a paternalistic model that distrib-
uted to each according to their own needs.
16
28  White (1986), in his analysis of communist legitimacy, refers to this feature of socialist systems as 
“social eudaemonic legitimation”
1.3.2 A model of institutional change and continuity
Above I have argued that  legitimacy is a key factor to explain institutional change and 
have discussed the sources of legitimacy in the Vietnamese case. The next step is to 
clarify how legitimacy  is related to other variables and institutional change, and out-
line the process that leads to such an evolution through variations in the level of le-









This model sees structural factors as the primary source of institutional change, but 
instead of establishing a direct link between the two it  represents the process of 
change taking place through the decisive intervening role of legitimacy and the inter-
action between social and state actors.29 Such external structural forces as changes in 
the international economic system or technological advancement affect virtually  all 
nation states and their ability to secure the welfare of their citizens. So, for example, 
the economic crises of the mid-1980s, which came after years of decreasing economic 
growth in the Soviet bloc, severely affected the ability of the Vietnamese state to de-
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29 This means that, even in presence of similar structural dynamics (like for instance a system change 
from the socialist economic model) outcomes in terms of institutional setting can be very dissimilar.
liver high levels of social welfare. The term “performance” in the model refers pre-
cisely to the ability of institutions to deliver a broad spectrum of outcomes that their 
citizens perceive as valuable, ranging from political rights, to a functioning judiciary, 
healthcare, education and so forth. Institutions’ ability  to perform affects the legiti-
macy they enjoy  among social actors: the better the performance, the higher the level 
of legitimacy.30  Along these lines, many observers reported a “legitimacy crisis” in 
socialist countries in the second half of the 1980s.31 Furhtermore, the level of legiti-
macy is also crucial for the functioning of institutions themselves, since it affects the 
commitment of individuals and social groups to make them work.32 
The model’s crucial link is between legitimacy and institutional change. It assumes 
that in the long run institutions can only persist if they  are legitimate. The concept of 
“legitimacy crises” is therefore of central importance in this process. A legitimacy cri-
sis can be defined as a situation in which the foundations of authority are under such a 
severe strain that either substantial changes are introduced in the institutional system 
or it will face a serious threat of collapsing. Following the observations outlined in § 
3.1, such a threat of collapse can happen following two paths. First, citizens may sim-
ply cease contributing to the functioning of institutions or even actively undermine 
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30 This is an important simplification of the model. The theory of legitimacy outlined in § 3.1 stated that 
legitimacy depends not only on institutional performance, but also on a symbolic sphere of values. For 
this reason, the level of legitimacy of a state can also change following a significant shift in the value 
system of its citizens. The model thus simplifies the dynamics of legitimacy by treating its symbolic 
dimension as a constant. This choice does not intend to cast doubts on the significance of value change 
for legitimacy, but it is just an assumption that the gap in value orientations between society and the 
state has so far not reached a critical point in Vietnam. Indeed, values arguably change much more 
slowly than institutional performance and may therefore be considered constant in a study like this 
where the time frame of the observations is shorter than two decades. 
31  It has particularly been the case of studies explaining the breakdown of socialist rule in Eastern 
Europe.
32 As Gilley notes, models recurring to legitimacy as an explanatory factor treat institutional perform-
ance and institutions endogenously, “where they are both a consequence and a cause of legitimacy” 
(2008:260).
their performance. As Scott (1985) has shown using empirical cases from Malaysia, 
this can also happen in an authoritarian polity where open opposition is repressed. 
Second, the citizens may conclude that they  have the opportunity to challenge the 
state directly,33 giving rise to mass opposition movements that demand radical change 
as in the case of many Eastern European countries in the late 1980s.34 It is thus possi-
ble to remark that this model identifies state-society relations as the area where future 
institutional outcomes are defined, and in legitimacy  the key discourse that  both the 
state and social actors use to engage one another in order to achieve their preferred 
outcomes. This is the area where agency is possible, where a number of social actors 
have the possibility to influence institutional outcomes through their own strategic ac-
tion.
This begs the question: what can a state do to neutralize the threat to its existence 
posed by a legitimacy crisis? Gilley (2008) identifies three possible state responses. 
The first is a substitution of legitimacy  with increased coercion or inducement for spe-
cific groups, a costly strategy that “usually  prefigures the deterioration of the regime” 
(2008:274). A second response is the reconfiguration of the basis of legitimacy, which 
typically results in an attempt to support new values and discourses that are more con-
gruent with the current regime performance. The third acknowledges the performance 
crisis and addresses social demands for reform, thus improving the actual performance 
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33 In Acemoglu & Robinson’s terms, they may acquire “de facto” political power that enables them to 
demand more radical redistributive policies.
34 The extensive literature about social movements, for example, studies precisely this second kind of 
outcomes.
of the institutional system.35  This third option is represented in Figure 1 with the 
backwards arrow linking institutional change to institutional performance. Regarding 
early doi moi, Vietnamese authorities chose in that circumstance the third kind of re-
sponse, creating the premises for prolonged and sustained economic growth (im-
proved performance). However, the introduction of market mechanisms in socialist 
systems has eroded their institutional performance in two ways. On one hand their 
ability  to ensure equality, one of the basis of legitimacy in socialist systems, is seri-
ously compromised by  unavoidable income polarization and class formation. On the 
other hand, the welfare system gradually becomes subject to market laws, and the 
“from cradle to grave” socialist model has to come to terms with the restructuring and 
retreat of the state, or, to express it in the terms of the Vietnamese nomenclature, to 
“socialization”. How have the Vietnamese political elites responded to this second 
challenge?
1.3.3 Mass organizations
This paper finds a partial explanation of the limited institutional change in doi moi in 
how some existing institutions have evolved during the reform era, namely those same 
organizations that have been regulating state-society relations in pre-reform Vietnam. 
These institutions are generally  referred to as mass organizations (MOs), large party-
led associations of members belonging to one specific social group  like women, farm-
ers and youth. The analysis developed in the next chapters36 will show that MOs have 
been a crucial element in the strategy  of the VCP of maintaining high levels of popular 
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35  Note that institutional reform does not necessarily mean democratization. States have a plurality of 
concessions that they can make to their citizens, civil and politcal rights being only a part of them. 
What exactly the concessions made are, as the model suggests and as this paper argues in the next sec-
tion,  is a matter of how state-society relations evolve, or in other words of the strategies pursued by 
political actors.
36 Chapter four will offer a more detailed analysis of MOs.
legitimacy  without compromising its monopoly of political power. The renovation of 
MOs has improved their institutional performance, thereby providing a new source of 
legitimacy  to compensate for growing social tensions, and it has done so within the 
well-defined boundaries of the one-party political system.
In choosing to focus on structures established and run by the state to channel its rela-
tions with key social sectors, this paper makes the controversial choice of ignoring a 
highly  debated area of state-society  relations in Vietnam, namely, the development of 
a civil society independent of the state. I do so for three reasons. The first is that non-
state associational life in Vietnam is not yet anything comparable to Western-style 
civil society  in terms of its ability to engage the state critically and influence its major 
policies. Vietnamese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are actually capa-
ble of influencing policy-making at any  level are more the exception than the rule, and 
even formally  independent organizations often have close ties with the state as in the 
case of the research centers that have been proliferating of late (Gray 1999). Second, 
unlike local NGOs, MOs are large and powerful organizations that are a crucial and 
valued source of feedback from social sectors for the political elites, a privileged 
status that grants them exclusive access to policy  makers and ability to influence their 
decisions, also in virtue of their special institutional status. Finally, MOs have been 
playing a major role in the politics of rural development, an area of particular interest 
because the potential of open confrontation with the regime is perhaps higher due to 
the presence of several international actors pursuing a democratic agenda and the per-
sistence of a growing urban-rural divide.
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1.4 The research project
This final section develops the research question at  the core of this paper, and some 
research hypotheses that the analysis put forward in the next chapters aims to verify. It 
will then illustrate how this study is structured and how its results are presented to the 
reader.
1.4.1 Research question
To understand how Vietnam has managed to become a largely market-driven economy 
without abandoning its Leninist political system, it is not enough to look at structural 
developments or social forces independent from the realm of state and party bureauc-
racies. Some major developments that explain these dynamics of limited institutional 
change have actually been taking place within structures that predate the economic 
renovation policies of the second half of the 1980s, namely, in MOs. It is now possible 
to formulate the main research question of this paper as follows: what has been the 
role of MOs in the doi moi process of continuity and change, and what is its signifi-
cance for the persistence of an authoritarian polity in Vietnam?
This study argues that MOs have undergone a substantial institutional restructuring 
under doi moi, which has transformed them into hybrid organizations sharing features 
of both state structures and civil society associations. In particular, while there is sub-
stantial novelty in some of the functions they  perform for their members and the rela-
tions they entertain with other actors like foreign donors and NGOs, they  have also 
maintained some important features of pre-reform Vietnam. On one hand, MOs have 
abandoned their main role of conveying ideological propaganda to the masses to be-
come social welfare agencies that provide a wide range of services to their members 
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(with staff at the lower levels working on a voluntary basis) and a forum where feed-
back and criticism of government policies can be expressed without fear. On the other 
hand, they have maintained their subordinate role to the VCP and strengthened their 
function of social control over their members on behalf of the political elites. This has 
benefited the state in two ways. The first  is that  the empowerment of MOs and their 
ability  to attract foreign funding has successfully  balanced the social tensions arising 
from increasing inequalities due to economic restructuring. The second is that the 
communication and social control structures at the state’s disposal have been modern-
ized at little cost and without granting significant concessions in terms of political 
rights. In other words, MOs have contributed to an important improvement of institu-
tional performance, thus increasing their own level of legitimacy among their mem-
bers and the population in general in times of potential legitimacy crisis.37 Vietnamese 
political elites were therefore able to respond to a potential threat with limited institu-
tional reform that improved performance in the provision of social and economic serv-
ices (and to a good extent in civil liberties as well), thereby avoiding a broader reform 
of the political system and the extension of political rights.38
1.4.2 Research hypotheses
This study looks at institutional changes and continuities in MOs to argue that they 
have in some respects been an example of reform, and in some others of a rejection of 
political renovation. In this context, given the high discrepancy between official poli-
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37 Also, increasing to the willingness of the people to contribute to their effective functioning.
38  This is not to suggest that the improved performance of MOs operations translates directly into in-
creased legitimacy for local party cadres and authorities instead of just increasing MOs legitimacy. This 
paper will actually show that local communities seem to demarcate clearly between MOs and local 
authorities and party structures, where MOs are perceived as more effective and trustworthy institutions 
compared with other state bureaucracies. However, the “legitimacy surplus” produced by MOs renova-
tion is still channeled into an organization organic to the one-party political system.
cies and their implementation, an institutional analysis that focused solely  on regula-
tory statements and official governance documents would be of little use. A more ac-
curate approach would take into consideration what in fact involves MOs action, es-
pecially in the areas of the functions that  MOs perform for their members and of the 
relations between them and other institutional actors (including local authorities, the 
VCP, international NGOs and donors and local communities). In particular, when we 
look at  MO agency, it is possible to differentiate between some features of MOs that 
are quite similar to NGO actorness in other parts of the world (and can therefore be 
considered an element of novelty  in an authoritarian polity), and some others that do 
not seem to set MOs apart from other state organs, and can therefore be viewed as 
elements of continuity with the party-led political system. We thus use the presence 
(or absence) of “civil society”39 agency features as a benchmark to assess the level of 
institutional innovation (or continuity) in Vietnamese MOs.
The formulation of more detailed research hypotheses from this perspective requires 
two steps. The first one is to review the literature on civil society  to identify what the 
main features of NGOs or non-state organizations are vis-a-vis the state. This is done 
in section 4.3.1, with particular reference to the roles that NGOs (and international 
NGOs more specifically) are supposed to play in the politics of development. Sec-
ondly, this theoretical framework must be juxtaposed with the empirical reality of 
MOs in Vietnam. This can be achieved through a preliminary review of both the cur-
rent literature on post-doi moi Vietnamese MOs and the author’s own fieldwork in 
Hanoi.40  Following this logical basis, this thesis attempts to verify  six research hy-
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39  This concept will be elaborated later. For the moment, we can consider civil society a synonym of 
non-governmental, non-business agency.
40 Chapter four is a literature review on state-society relations in Vietnam, where section 4.2 deals pre-
cisely with the literature on MOs. My fieldwork is presented in chapter five.  
potheses. Among the following six propositions, hypotheses H1-H3 highlight discon-
tinuities from the past, while statements H4-H6 suggest that fundamental variables 
have remained constants in times of change:
H1 – The main role of MOs has shifted from a political to a social one, from a focus 
on mass mobilization and ideological propaganda to problem-solving and the provi-
sion of services to individual members.
H2 – MOs have been working under an inclusive model of project management, a 
broad partnership with a host of such actors as foreign donors and NGOs, local com-
munities, local NGOs, local administrations and party cadres. In addition, they have 
fostered the inclusion of marginalized groups into the public debate.
H3 – MOs have been developing a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the state in devel-
opment projects. They are now perceived as more efficient, effective, transparent and 
committed than state structures and are therefore a precious instrument to attract for-
eign assistance in a period where new social needs are arising.
H4 – Similarly  to a state bureaucracy, MOs are large and hierarchical organizations 
with several levels of governance. MOs are state-funded and their staff has the status 
of civil servants. 
H5 – MOs have maintained the ability to monitor their members to the grassroots 
level, showing an outstanding level of knowledge of the territory and its people, which 
makes them exceptional agents of social control for the state. The role of MOs as pol-
icy implementers and public communicators is still crucial.
H6 – Despite their de facto operational independence vis-à-vis the VCP in develop-
ment projects, MOs are still dependent on the state; they follow a logic of allegiance 
to party cadres that prevents them from articulating a critique of state actors.
1.4.3 Research design
This thesis studies the evolution of MOs during the doi moi period.41 However, the 
reader should be warned that this is not an attempt to give a full account of the agency 
of MOs in Vietnam. It  will become clear later in this paper that MOs constitute an im-
portant part of the Vietnamese political system. Such organizations are very large and 
present a significant degree of diversity in many respects. It is plausible to believe, for 
example, that their relationships with local authorities or their own constituencies 
might differ across different regions and provinces. Judging from to the fieldwork ma-
terial I have gathered, it is often the case that the patterns of state-society relations we 
observe vary  according to MO, development project, personal relationships among the 
main actors involved, previous professional experience, institutional capacity  of single 
MO chapters, and so forth. In this respect, the conclusions I will draw from the devel-
opment projects analyzed and the interviews carried out are not generalizable to the 
reality  of the whole country. The research design I illustrate in the next paragraph does 
not offer a sufficient empirical basis to extend the research findings to other contexts I 
am less familiar with. Rather, this work is better understood as a further step in ex-
plaining the outcomes of Vietnam’s transition towards a market-based Socialist sys-
tem, a contribution to understand how a process of radical economic restructuring has 
taken place within a frame of high political stability.
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41 More precisely, this paper accepts the convention of considering 1986 as the year marking the begin-
ning of substantial economic reform in Vietnam. A study of the impact of economic,  social and political 
change on MOs could therefore focus on a period including roughly the last two decades (1986-2006).
With this caveat  in mind, the specific limitations of the research design pertain both to 
the bibliographical-archival research and to the interviews carried out during the 
fieldwork. As far as the literature reviewed is concerned, I do not use material written 
in Vietnamese. This is due to my insufficient language skills, which do not allow me 
to access academic and other kinds of Vietnamese sources. The material I have re-
viewed has been written in English, German and Italian, mostly by foreign scholars 
and professionals of the development community  in Vietnam. The development pro-
jects analyzed come from a database maintained by the United Nations Office in Ha-
noi. Within the database, I have selected the development projects for which a detailed 
report was available,42 and among those I have chosen those reports explicitly  men-
tioning the role of one or more MOs in the project. This totaled to about twenty re-
ports of projects carried out from the early 1990s to 2006, upon the initiative of vari-
ous international organizations and NGOs, in partnership with different local actors. 
Most of the projects have been carried out in various provinces in northern Vietnam, 
and the Vietnamese Women’s Union (VWU) has been involved more frequently than 
other MOs. 
I carried out field research in Hanoi from July  to August 2008.43 Besides the afore-
mentioned archival research, I have conducted ten semi-structured, qualitative inter-
views. I have chosen not to interview the final users and beneficiaries of the develop-
ment projects themselves. This is undoubtedly  a major shortcoming of the research 
design, and my choice is motivated by several factors such as time and resources limi-
tations of my research project, the geographical remoteness of this target group, lan-
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42  Either online or in the archives of various International organizations in Hanoi, such as the United 
Nations, the World Bank and the NGO Resource Center. 
43 The project received a grant from the National University of Singapore’s Graduate Research Support 
Scheme.
guage skills and so forth. I have therefore chosen to limit my sample to MO staff and 
their counterpart in international organizations and NGO, who, I reasoned, are able to 
provide sound information on MOs activity  due to their first-hand experience. Inter-
viewees were chosen with a snowball-sampling method and included three officials of 
the Vietnamese Women’s Union (VWU), two academic experts on Vietnamese soci-
ety, and five officials of foreign NGOs with multiple years of professional experience 
in development projects carried out throughout the country in partnership  with MOs 
and the VWU in particular. The development projects they have taken part to include 
virtually  all areas of development politics, such as healthcare, children and youth de-
velopment, education, disabled development, women rights, professional training. 
Most of the interviewees were foreigners (eight Europeans and two Vietnamese).
1.4.4 Contents of the study
After this introductory chapter, the second section of the thesis is based on secondary 
sources and aims to develop in detail two issues that have been introduced above. 
Chapter two analyzes Vietnam’s recent economic, social and political renovation, of-
fering a more detailed picture of the processes outlined in 1.2.1-2. The aim of such an 
analysis is to clarify the crucial developments that shaped public life in Vietnam in 
recent years. The third chapter discusses the central concept of the model of institu-
tional change in 1.3.2, namely legitimacy. After formulating a more articulate defini-
tion of this concept, it highlights its relevance in the study of political and institutional 
change; it then relates the debate on legitimacy to Socialist  systems, their collapse and 
reform, and the Vietnamese experience in particular. 
Chapter four reviews the existing literature on state-society relations in Vietnam, aim-
ing to position the research project of this thesis within the academic debate about re-
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cent developments in Vietnamese state-society relations. In particular, an introduction 
of the leading approaches in studying the state and society in Vietnam prepares the 
discussion of two key  issues of high relevance to this research. The first one pertains 
to the role of MOs and mass mobilization in the Vietnamese political systems, which 
is linked to the discussion on corporatism in doi moi Vietnam. The second is the 
emergence of civil society in Vietnam and its potential as a critical counterbalance to 
the state.
Chapter five is the core of the analysis, where the theoretical model illustrated in fig-
ure one will be applied to empirical material to test  the six hypotheses above. This part 
of the analysis is based on both primary and secondary research. The chapter is struc-
tured into two parts, the first one analyzing hypotheses relating to changes in MOs, 
and the second one focusing on continuities.
The concluding chapter will discuss the significance of the results presented in chapter 
four for the current academic debate on democratic transitions and state-society  rela-
tions in Vietnam.  
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Chapter Two: Vietnam’s renovation
This chapter explores the economic, social and political transformation that has char-
acterized Vietnam in the last two decades.  A portrait of contemporary Vietnam as the 
outcome of diverging pressures, some of them propelling various kinds of change, 
others pushing to maintain the status quo.  The result of this tension has brought about 
the coexistence of both elements of innovation and continuity with pre-reform Viet-
nam in key areas. The Vietnamese economy has radically changed since the late 
1980s, and equally  important transformations have marked the country’s social and 
political life. The below section outlines changes and continuities in Vietnam’s doi 
moi, focusing first on economic change, followed by social development and associa-
tional life, and finally the political system.
2.1 Economy
As mentioned in the first chapter, doi moi has been characterized as a period of pro-
longed and sustained expansion of all aspects of the Vietnamese economy. Enhanced 
economic performance has been due to the gradual introduction of a series of market-
based measures that replaced centralized economic planning. During the 1970s and 
the early  1980s the powerful State Planning Committee (SPC) was in charge of the 
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allocation of virtually all economic resources and of determining production targets 
for economic units and sectors. However, the limits of this system were already dis-
cernible in the late 1970s. The increasing technological and financial complexity of 
most economic operations, for example, made it nearly  impossible for a single under-
staffed body to produce plans for the entire economy, and the proliferation of norms 
related to the planning process often resulted in the production of goods unsuitable for 
the intended users. Melanie Beresford (1999) reports that illegal “fence-breaking” ac-
tivities were common under the centrally  planned system to overcome plan distor-
tions. Usually an initiative of single economic units, such activities allowed a limited 
accumulation of capital to overcome the recurring shortage of production factors, or to 
convert production if the prescribed items were impossible to produce. Vietnamese 
authorities gradually  realized that  fence-breaking activities met concrete market de-
mands they had not been able to anticipate, and often resulted in more efficient eco-
nomic organization than central plans did. The abolition towards the end of the 1980s 
of all output targets and fixed prices “was but the final step  in the erosion of the old 
planning system” (Beresford 1999:18).
The late 1980s is indeed the period identified by many observers as the watershed be-
tween the old planning system and the current one based on a market economy. A cru-
cial event for the design of future economic policies was the 1986 6th Party Congress, 
an assembly that “recognized the existence and essential role of a multi-ownership 
structure in Vietnam’s economy” (Vo and Pham 2004:65). Less than three years later, 
the approval of a comprehensive and radical reform package steered decisively the 
Vietnamese economy towards a more open and competitive system. In addition to 
price liberalization and the dismissal of production targets, the 1989 reforms package 
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included a large devaluation and the unification of the exchange rate, a reduction in 
subsides for SOEs, increased interest rates, incentives to private investment and FDI, 
the removal of some trade barriers, and a reform of the agricultural sector that  basi-
cally replaced the cooperative systems with a new one where households were the ba-
sic production unit.
Few would dispute that these new economic policies provided the regulatory frame-
work without which the recent economic success would not have been possible. How-
ever, this should not lead to the conclusion that change was exclusively initiated by 
state policies, or that the transition to the market started only  after 1989. Fence-
breaking activities within the planned economy and the way Vietnamese authorities 
dealt with it suggest in fact a different pattern of institutional change. In the early 
1980s, for instance, an increasing number of production units were deliberately con-
travening SPC directives, creating a de facto “hybrid transitional model” where prices, 
costs and markets were playing an increasing important role (Fforde & De Vylder 
1996:13). From this angle, the attitude of authorities towards such new processes 
seems to have been more reactionary than proactive, since it often consisted in a mix 
of concessions to new emerging realities they could no longer control and attempts to 
restate the Leninist principles of the plan economy 44. For this reason, the transition to 
the market that is such a pivotal element in doi moi is probably better understood as a 
largely bottom-up process propelled by the emergence of new economic actors rather 
than a top-down government reform program. Adam Fforde (2002) has shown how 
this gradual introduction of market mechanisms, related to new property regimes, 
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44 As examples of such attempts to recentralize the economic systems, Fforde and De Vylder mention 
the clampdown on the free market in Ho Chi Minh City and the campaign in favour of agricultural col-
lectivization in the Mekong Delta.
have led to the formation and consolidation of a new bourgeoisie that has reaped most 
of the benefits of the reform process. 
In spite of such radical transformations, an important thread of continuity runs through 
doi moi. While the state has allowed the private sector to play a crucial role in recent 
economic growth, several analyses suggest that this does not imply either a genuine 
acceptance of the virtues of the private sector, a passive role of the state or an increas-
ingly  subordinate position to private interests. For one, Leung and Riedel observe that, 
despite awareness of the importance of private initiative for economic performance, 
among political elites “there is great political ambivalence about the private sector” 
(2001:2). Negative ideological attitudes towards the market are due to the belief that 
the rise of non-state economic actors may bring about potential political instability, 
and often economic policy is aimed not only at the development of the private sector, 
but also to its containment, as the slowing pace of economic reforms in the 1990s 
shows. Gainsborough’s (2007) study of transnational trade in a northern border region 
also suggests that  the state retains a position of great influence on economic activiti-
es45. Other such scholars as Masina (2006:153-56) have argued that a new pattern of 
state-business relations is emerging, where business groups have easy and relatively 
influential access to policy-makers, but the state maintains a preeminent position simi-
lar to East Asian experiences of developmental states. Finally, some authors have used 
the term “market socialism” to refer to Vietnam’s hybrid economic model, one that 
juxtaposes market elements with a strong state presence in several economic sectors 
and a solid commitment by policy makers to redistributive policies.
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45 His study on the dependency of private capital on the state (2002) seems to point to a similar direc-
tion.
2.2 Society
The economic revolution outlined above has been closely  intertwined with a number 
of transformations in Vietnamese society that  are of central importance to understand 
the evolution of state-society relations in the last few years. One of the most signifi-
cant is that the quality  of life for many Vietnamese, especially of the vast majority  liv-
ing in rural areas, has improved substantially in several key areas such as education 
and healthcare. Considering what is regarded by most accounts as a solid success in 
poverty  reduction, it would seem that at least some of the benefits of the sustained 
economic growth have trickled down to the most disadvantaged. According to a gov-
ernment study  published in 2004 only 23.17% of the Vietnamese were living below 
the poverty line46, a staggering contrast with the figure of the same study carried out 
in 2003 (58%) and of an estimated 70% in the mid 1980s.47  However, such official 
statistics based on government poverty  thresholds suggest a partially misleading pic-
ture of development in Vietnam. For instance, the fact that in 2003 a UNDP study 
showed that 63.7% of the population was living on less than two US dollars a day48 is 
a good indicator that, despite impressive improvements, Vietnam remains a largely 
poor country as it was in the past.
The good performance in poverty  reduction and similar advancements in a host of so-
cioeconomic indicators suggest that even the most vulnerable strata of the population 
have benefited substantially from the economic boom. However, as Philip  Taylor 
(2004:25) writes in an introduction to an edited volume on this subject, there is plenty 
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46 Source: General Statistic Office of Vietnam (2004). Figures referring to government poverty standard 
at 2004 prices.
47 Reported in Masina (2006:133-4).
48 Reported in Taylor (2004:25).
of evidence that the gap between the haves and the have-nots in Vietnam is not only 
persisting, but  widening rapidly. Social inequalities are rising along several dimen-
sions, including the gap  between the rich and the poor, women and men, Kinh people 
and ethnic minorities, urban and rural areas, northern and southern regions. While 
Vietnam has done better than other formerly Socialist countries in assuaging the in-
come inequality arising during the transition to the market,49 several indicators show 
that prosperity has also brought about increasing income disparities.50 Regional ine-
qualities are widening significantly, and the territorially uneven growth has led to 
staggering differences in income levels and development indicators across regions.51 
Ethnic minorites also shoulder a highly disproportionate share of the social and eco-
nomic backwardness when compared with members of the Kinh ethnic majority.52 
These figures and comparable others point to the emergence of a growing number of 
areas where social tensions could lead to various forms of instability  if not adequately 
addressed. 
A different line of research reveals the existence of an ongoing process of values 
change in the population. As explained in the first chapter, one of the basic tenets of 
modernization theory is that socio-economic development favors the spread of a set of 
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49  Malesky (2008), for instance, compares economic inequality in Vietnam with China, finding that 
China shows higher levels of inequality throughout the liberalization process. A comparison with Rus-
sia would also support the claim that Vietnam was able to keep income inequality at lower levels com-
pared with other ex-Socialist experiences.
50 Examples include the Gini coefficient, which increased from .33 in 1993 to .37 in 2002, and the dis-
parity between the top and bottom ten per cent of households, which in 2002 was 12.5 times compared 
with 10.6 times in 1996. See Taylor (2004:7). 
51  For instance, the regional breakdown of poverty rates reported by Scott and Chuyen (2004:105-6) 
shows that poverty incidence varies greatly across the country,  ranging from a value of 10.6% in the 
Southeast to 68% in the mountainous Northwest. Also,  inequality values differ significantly, with the 
prosperous Southeast leading the ranking for inequality index and less developed regions showing 
greater equality. 
52 “While the 53 ethnic minority groups comprise 14 per cent of the population of Vietnam, they make 
up a disproportionate 29 per cent of the poor, up from 19 per cent in 1992-93” (Scott and Chuyen 
2004:109).
values conducive to democracy. However, the same introduction also remarked that 
Vietnam is still an underdeveloped country  and we should therefore expect such val-
ues to be consolidated only in a minority of the population. As a matter of fact, only  a 
small portion of the population in a largely rural country  like Vietnam follows a life-
style comparable with that of an advanced industrial country, while most  Vietnamese 
people still follow traditional ways of life. According to some authors, available sur-
veys suggest that important changes may be occurring, for example in the areas of 
economic values (Pham & Pham), or even as far as attitudes toward democracy are 
concerned53. However, methodological issues cast serious doubts on the appropriate-
ness of inter-survey comparisons, and available studies do not allow systematic longi-
tudinal studies across various population groups. Moreover, even in segments where 
new values seem to be more consolidated, evidence that such new attitudes are likely 
to develop into some form of political awareness is limited.54
Another remarkable feature of Vietnamese society under economic renovation is the 
booming of its associational life. Starting from the late 1980s, Vietnamese citizens 
have benefited from the changes brought about by the new economic order, which al-
lowed them unprecedented opportunities to engage in activities independent from the 
state. On one hand, the increasing inequalities arising from economic liberalization 
and the restructuring of the state have often generated new welfare needs that state 
agencies have not always been able to address, thus creating opportunities for citizens 
to set up small non-profit associations and fill this lack of social services. On the other 
hand, increased international openness has also allowed several foreign NGOs to enter 
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53 The 2001 World Values Survey for Vietnam is often mentioned in this respect. See for instance Ong 
(2004).
54 At this regard, see King et al. (2008) for a study of cultural change in Vietnamese young profession-
als.
the country, providing locals with opportunities to cooperate with them in develop-
ment projects. 
Associational life in Vietnam also consolidated following some new regulatory  provi-
sions that set up a legal framework for the establishment and the management of non-
profit private organizations.55 The first  legal steps in this direction date back to 1989-
90, when the setting up  of popular organizations was officially  allowed,56 and a num-
ber of decrees and directives followed in an attempt by the Vietnamese authorities to 
control tightly a potentially destabilizing phenomenon. However, as we remarked for 
the transition to a market-based economy, it  would be a mistake to conclude that ma-
jor change is a consequence of innovation in official policies. In this field as well, evi-
dence suggests that the “illegal” establishment of private organizations without the 
approval of government official has been commonplace, and that officials have often 
decided to adjust “rules and regulations in order to catch up with changes already 
happening on the ground” (Kerkvliet 2003:3). 
2.3 Politics
Although political elites have been much more concerned with economic than politi-
cal experimentation, the country’s political system has been evolving during the eco-
nomic reform years. Beresford and Phong (1998) offer a detailed review of the Viet-
namese political system before doi moi. The key feature during the period 1955-1986 
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55  This does not mean that associational life independent from the state was a completely new phe-
nomenon in Vietnam. In the precolonial period, civic associations had to face a repressive environment 
where the imperial court was intolerant of organizations operating outside the sphere of the court’s bu-
reaucracy, and public spaces were more often used as private venues (Nguyen P. A. 2005).  Neverthe-
less, Popkin (1979:97-7) reports a long tradition of civic life, especially in rural areas where associa-
tions for insurance and mutual aid were operating. At this regard, see also Jamieson (1993:35-7). 
Woodside (1971) argues that a resilient associational activity continued during the repressive regime of 
the colonial period, as the case of urban social association shows.
56 See Vasavakul (2004:33)
was the “partification” of the state, aimed at the implementation of the VCP’s project 
of a Socialist society. This involved “not only direct Party  rule (the Party-state), but 
establishment of central planning and expanding ownership  and control of the means 
of production” (1998:33).  In such a polity, the contiguity between the state and the 
party  machineries was crucial. In theory  Party and state were discernible57, but in fact 
the two systems were interposed and overlapping, since the Party maintained its own 
network within the state apparatus, and top civil servants were also serving as high 
ranking party members (Beresford & Phong 1998:46-49). Another important aspect 
regards the legislative power, which is markedly different from democratic systems. 
While nominally the National Assembly and sub-national legislative bodies were in 
charge of passing laws, Party  resolutions and directives and government decrees were 
in fact the source of legislation. The National Assembly  met infrequently to approve 
unanimously executive measures whose content was often secret.
According to Turley (1993b), since the beginning of the reform process some factions 
of the VCP have been aware that the new economic and social reality required a more 
open political system. Such a new system would still follow the exclusive political 
leadership of the Party, but would be based on the rule of law and grant some basic 
civil rights to Vietnamese citizens. In the following years, gradual changes in the di-
rection of a more inclusive political system were introduced, generally falling under 
two broad categories. The first was the attempt to involve a large number of people in 
the renovation process. With this purpose, limited reforms were implemented in insti-
tutions such as local councils and mass organizations, whose members were given a 
greater say in the choice of their representatives, easier access to policy  information 
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57 According to the principle that the Party leads, the state manages and the people are the masters.
and greater openness in the public debate and the media. Secondly, the functions of 
elective bodies both at the national and the local level (the National Assembly and the 
local People’s Councils) were strengthened in the late 1980s vis-à-vis the role of party 
cadres and appointed state officials. Election procedures for such institutions were 
made more competitive and open, with the aim of changing the condition of subordi-
nation of popular representatives to non-elected officials58. 
However, the clearer demarcation between Party  and state bodies and the liberaliza-
tion of the political system have taken place at a slow pace and to a very limited extent 
if compared with economic renovation. Vietnam largely retains the features of an 
authoritarian one-party  system that suppresses harshly any serious attempt to question 
the monopolistic management of power by the VCP59. Not only  are political parties 
banned, but the innovations introduced into the electoral systems have increased its 
competitiveness only marginally. The VCP still holds absolute discretion in the selec-
tion of candidates60 (often only a few more than the available seats), and several elec-
toral positions are also subject to party  vetting procedures. Government programs of 
so called “grassroots democracy”, despite increasing formal participation of citizens in 
local politics, are still a practice very far from developing a discourse of democracy61. 
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58  Various evidence since 1993 suggests that the trends towards (at least formally) more participatory 
forms of governance and relatively stronger legislative institutions are consolidating, especially at the 
local level. See for example McElwee et al. (2006). 
59 A leadership role that was restated by the 1992 constitution: “The Communist Party of Vietnam, the 
vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, the faithful representative of the rights and interests of the 
working class, the toiling people, and the whole nation, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and 
Ho Chi Minh's thought, is the force leading the State and society”. (Art. 4).
60  At the national level for example, only 43 of the 493 seats were won by non-party members in the 
last elections in 2007, and the total number of candidates nationwide was only of 875. Most importantly 
though, only 30 candidates were “self-nominated” (without affiliation to or endorsement by the party or 
party-related bodies), and of them only 1 won a seat. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007).
61 See for instance Tran (2004) for an analysis of elections in a local community that casts doubts on the 
actual power of voters. 
Finally, even in the case of the extended civil liberties presented in the previous sec-
tion, freedom of press and association is only allowed to the extent that it does not 
touch upon political issues, and social actors working in sensitive areas such as gen-
der, religion and ethnicity often face severe constraints.
Vietnam has also undertaken several initiatives to renovate its lackluster bureaucracy, 
attempting to channel some of the additional revenues coming from economic growth 
into programs to strengthen government capacity and modernize governance (Quan 
2000b). In particular, major policies have tried to reinforce the rule of law and to es-
tablish new regulatory  agencies for the infant market economy, to simplify bureau-
cratic procedures, to rationalize the organization of the state and to downsize and train 
the workforce. However, despite such recent efforts to reinvigorate state agencies, 
Vietnam retains a backward state apparatus, plagued with poorly trained personnel 
and rampant corruption. Transparency International ranks Vietnam as a highly corrupt 
country 62, and several anti-corruption campaigns have not eradicated this deep-rooted 
practice, a problem particularly felt at  the local level and fueled by  the very  low sala-
ries received by civil servants.
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62 Vietnam’s 2007 Corruption Perception Index ranks 123rd out of 179 countries. It received a score of 
2.6 on a 10 points scale where 10 is awarded to a country with no perceived corruption. 
Chapter Three: Legitimacy in Vietnam
This chapter elaborates on the concept of legitimacy and its relevance for political 
change in Vietnam. A brief discussion of this notion will introduce an analysis of the 
relevance of legitimacy  for political change. In the third section of the chapter, Viet-
nam is studied as an example of the coexistence of various legitimation modes, and 
the implications of socioeconomic renovation for legitimacy are explored.
3.1 Tracking political legitimacy
The first chapter recalled Rodney Barker’s definition of legitimacy63, one that stressed 
the centrality  of concepts like “belief”, “rightfulness” and “moral authority”. In the 
words of another author (Gilley 2006:500), we can say that “a state is more legitimate 
the more that it is treated by  its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political 
power”. These and comparable definitions of the concept that political theorists have 
discussed show that the central issue related to legitimacy is a normative one, pertain-
ing to some core values about  the organization of society as a whole. From this per-
spective, studying political legitimacy would simply require a focus on the value ori-
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63 The “belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are 
obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest,  but because they are believed to have moral authority,  
because citizens believe that they ought to obey” (Barker 1990:11).
entations and attitudes towards the state of a certain population. However, the concept 
is much more complex and difficult to delineate when a more detailed analysis of the 
origins and evolution of legitimacy  over time is attempted, and when the role of le-
gitimacy in political phenomena is assessed. In fact, legitimacy not only  entails norms 
and values, but also issues of legality, institutional performance, political behavior, 
historical heritage, and so forth. 
To understand such a complex and multidimensional concept let us disaggregate it 
into its different elements. According to Beetham (1991:15-19), three major dimen-
sions of legitimacy can be identified. The first is the legal dimension of legitimacy and 
concerns the existence of a set of rules to which power has to conform to be deemed 
legitimate. Every society has both written and unwritten customs and practices that 
regulate the acquisition and exertion of power, for example, periodical competitive 
elections in democracies. However, what is legal is not necessarily  perceived as right. 
The rules of power require some sort of justification to be perceived as legitimate, and 
it is only possible to justify them recurring to “beliefs shared by  both dominant and 
subordinate” (1991:17). The second dimension thus pertains to the identification of a 
host of common values, of a general interest  that justifies the existence of the rules. 
The third dimension is behavioral, or more precisely the “demonstrable expression of 
consent on the part of the subordinate to the particular power relation in which they 
are involved” (1991:18). Beetham argues that such manifest acts of consent (for ex-
ample, the participation in an election) contribute to legitimacy in two fundamental 
ways. On one hand, they create a “normative commitment” for both the subordinate 
and the dominant, and, on the other hand, the symbolic force of such actions rein-
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forces and confirms the legitimacy of the power relation to third parties not involved 
in the relationship.
The sources of political legitimacy vary  across societies and political systems. For the 
purposes of this study we can classify the bases of political legitimacy in three 
categories.64 Traditional legitimacy is based on the specific historic and cultural heri-
tage of a society, a background that provides the moral justification of authority. So, 
for example, in a theocratic system, traditional religious principles provide the norma-
tive source of legitimation of the state; the word of God is the basis to assess what is 
right and what is wrong and the foundation of the legal system, while many political 
leaders are recruited among the clergy. Value-rational legitimacy is based on the abil-
ity  of a state to create an economic, social and institutional environment consistent 
with some over-arching normative goals. For instance, a Socialist system will strive to 
create a classless society, grounded in perfect economic equality  and a command 
mode of production. The actual way in which normative values in value-rational sys-
tems are translated into political regimes can either rest on political goals or on legal 
procedures65. In value-rational systems based on goals the emphasis is on attaining 
policy outcomes consistent with values shared by both elites and masses. In contrast, 
in value-rational systems based on law like Western democracies the crucial feature 
for the justification of authority is respecting a set of “rules of the game” that create 
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64 This is only one of the possible typologies of sources (or “types”, or “modes”) of legitimacy and le-
gitimation, and leaves out some categories that have been proposed by other scholars.  The reason for 
this exclusion is that other legitimacy sources are transitory and arguably cannot sustain a political re-
gime in the long term if they do not transform into one of the three above.  Weber’s (1968) famous dis-
tinction of three ideal types of legitimacy for example also included charisma, which stems from the 
personality and the exceptional qualities of the leader. Holmes (1993:17-18) identifies seven legitimacy 
modes, including the three above. 
65 Most students of legitimacy distinguish these alternatives as two separate sources of legitimation, one 
often called “goal-rational” and the other “legal-rational”. However, both goals and rules are closely 
linked to a normative dimension of values and visions of the world. Both sources of legitimation strive 
to implement a political and social project different from a traditional society, and are therefore grouped 
into the same category. 
the common standard to formulate evaluations on matters such as fairness, justice and 
desirability. Performance66 is the third source of legitimacy, and it is here understood 
as the ability  of the state to deliver concrete benefits in some key areas such as inter-
nal and external security, economic growth, administrative services and social welfare.
The measurement of a multidimensional and elusive concept such as political legiti-
macy has been a major challenge for social scientists. The difficulty of tracking it  has 
led some skeptics to dismiss legitimacy as “a mushy concept that political analysts do 
well to avoid”.67 Most  agree that political legitimacy is not a binary category, but a 
continuous variable whose level varies across time and space. However, there is no 
concord on how to measure it, and since it involves the measurement of attitudes, the 
comparative study  of legitimacy presents significant methodological challenges, espe-
cially  in authoritarian countries were public opinion research is usually a sensitive is-
sue. Holmes’ solution (1993:9) to this problem provides an example of how the meas-
urement of legitimacy can be achieved through a substitutive concept. He argues that 
the “observable and observed” phenomenon of corruption is closely  related to legiti-
macy and thus a good proxy for it.68  Focussing his analysis on Socialist systems, 
Holmes also contends that, in absence of overt manifestations of political dissent, a 
legitimacy  crisis (see 3.2) can be detected by tracking public statements of political 
elites. Bruce Gilley  (2006) instead adopts Beetham’s definition of legitimacy as a 
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66 This last mode is often referred to as eudaemonic legitimacy. Its inclusion in this list may be contro-
versial since many would argue that performance alone as a source of legitimacy is not sustainable in 
the long term, since for instance it is virtually impossible for a state to avoid all sorts of economic cri-
ses. However, as the next paragraphs show, performance has played a particularly important role in the 
legitimation of Socialist systems,  and should therefore be considered in this study as a major source of 
legitimacy. 
67 Huntington (1991:46), reported in Gilley (2006:500).
68 “For our purposes,  explicit references to crisis by leaders or others considered “authoritative” living 
in a country are accepted as evidence that some important political actors perceive the possibility or 
three-dimensional concept, identifying both attitudes and actions as indicators for the 
three dimensions of legitimacy. So, for example, he follows the convention of adopt-
ing perceived corruption levels and views about the civil service as one of the attitude-
based legitimacy indicators, while the actions he monitors include issues such as so-
cial movements, internal insurgencies, and election turnout. The aggregation of the 
single indicators is then conducted to produce a legitimacy score on a scale ranging 
from zero to ten.
3.2 Political legitimacy and institutional change
For political science, the study of legitimacy is of primary importance because the 
normative dimension of power relations is closely  connected to political behavior. 
This is actually a controversial statement that not all students of political phenomena 
would assent. Some, for instance, would argue that values and norms are a weak ex-
planatory factor of political behavior compared with self-interested decision making 
or with the resources that a state is able to mobilize to assure compliance. However, 
Beetham (1991:27) observes that people “relate to the powerful as moral agents as 
well as self-interested actors; they are cooperative and obedient on grounds of legiti-
macy as well as for reasons of prudence and advantage”. This means that, as outlined 
in the introduction, the degree of legitimacy in an institution has a direct impact on the 
quality of the compliance of its subordinates, a relationship that works through two 
channels (Suchman 1995:575-7). On one hand, individuals are more likely to supply 
resources and contribute to the performance of an institution they perceive as legiti-
mate. On the other hand, legitimacy influences how people understand an institution, 
and therefore it impacts the extent of the criticism and opposition it has to face. The 
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generation of consensus is thus arguably as important as coercion in explaining why 
an authoritarian polity persists, changes or democratizes. 
Most analyses of legitimacy attempt to highlight the nexus between legitimacy and 
institutional change focusing on what happens to specific institutions when the power 
they  exert loses legitimacy. Following Barrington Moore (1978), we can think of a 
“social contract” as the basis of legitimate authority, whereby rulers and subordinates 
must adhere to obligations they have contracted towards each other. From the perspec-
tive of the ruled, political power becomes illegitimate when the rulers do not fulfill to 
such obligations, 69 thus laying the grounds of unrest  and regime change. Similarly, in 
more recent literature, the notion of “legitimacy  crisis” is often applied to account for 
a diverse range of phenomena such as poor institutional performance, institutional re-
form programs or regime breakdowns in several regions of the world. Alagappa 
(1995b:59) defines a legitimacy crisis as a “situation in which the basis on which 
authority has been claimed or acknowledged is under such severe stress that there is 
strong possibility of destruction or transformation”. However, the erosion of legiti-
macy can take less severe forms than such a dire meltdown, leading to a situation in 
which institutions face some sort of “legitimacy gap”, “strain” or “deficit” that un-
dermines their functioning without posing a threat to their existence. This study  refers 
to either occurrence (existence of a threat to institutional persistence and legitimacy 
strain) as to legitimacy crises of varying intensity.
Following the typology of legitimacy sources outlined, there are three possible ways 
in which a state can lose its legitimacy. The first relates to a thorough values change 
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69 As far as the nature of these responsibilities towards the subordinates, according to Moore (1978: 20-
22) they can be understood as three different kinds of security, namely protection (against external 
enemies), public order and peace, and material security.
among the population, which creates a gap  between the values preserved and fostered 
by the state and those acknowledged by its citizens. For example, social and economic 
modernization may pose a serious threat  to the authority  of a traditional regime, since 
they  often come together with secularization processes. The second threat to legiti-
macy is what Habermas (1976) calls a “rationality crisis”. It occurs when a state im-
plements policies that are in open contrast with the values it claims to believe in and 
leads to an erosion of its authority among the population. Habermas’ example is the 
behavior of the state during economic crises in capitalist systems, when its increased 
intervention in the economy contradicts its ideology based on the virtues of the market 
economy. The third way is a performance crisis, meaning that the state fails to provide 
basic standards of security  and welfare to its citizens, due for example to severe limits 
in state capacity or the inability to contain economic crises.
3.3 Legitimacy in Vietnam
Throughout the history  of Vietnam, legitimation modes have been changing together 
with specific political and social circumstances. However, an analysis of legitimacy in 
pre-Socialist Vietnam goes beyond the scope of this thesis and we will therefore limit 
the analysis of legitimacy  in Vietnam to the Socialist era and the reform period. We 
can identify three main modes of legitimation that have prevailed in post- WWII Viet-
nam. The first  two are different forms of value-rational legitimation based on goals, 
one goal being the Socialist revolution and the other national independence. The third 
source of legitimacy stems from institutional performance, a crucial element in Social-
ist systems. The conclusion of this chapter in 3.3.4 shows that all three sources of le-
gitimacy may face decisive challenges in times of radical social and economic change.
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3.3.1 The Socialist revolution
The sources of legitimacy  in Socialist Vietnam are to a good extent comparable to 
those of other Socialist countries. One prominent comparativist of Communism, T. H. 
Rigby, characterized Socialist systems as mono-organizational, meaning that “nearly 
all social activities are run by hierarchies of appointed officials under the direction of 
a single overall command” (1990:82). In such systems, legitimacy stems directly from 
the Marxist-Leninist  doctrine, which sees the Communist party  as the leader of the 
proletarian revolution and the ultimate depository of power in the name of the people. 
Socialist Vietnam is no exception to this rule, since its constitution explicitly  identifies 
the VCP as the sole legitimate depository  of authority  and power, granting it a leading 
role in every aspect of public life.70 This guarantees the party the privileged status of 
exclusive representative of the population. Moreover, in support of their monopoly 
political power, Communist parties often adopt mass mobilizing tactics involving 
large numbers of people in the implementation of their policy goals. In Vietnam as in 
other countries, mass mobilization was crucial for the success of armed revolution, 
and later became an instrument to consolidate the legitimacy of party-rule through 
propaganda and the concession of limited forms of popular participation.71  
In this respect Socialist  systems follow the patterns of value-rational legitimation, 
where perhaps the most compelling super ordinate value is that of social equality. The 
party-state is legitimate because it implements the project  of a Communist society, an 
endless struggle for Communism. As far as Vietnam is concerned, Beresford remarks 
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70 See 2.3.
71 The MOs this thesis studies, as the Women’s Union and the Youth Association, have served a number 
of purposes including for instance the recruitment of military and civilian workforce, and the imple-
mentation of various policies formulated by the VCP (Porter 1993:87-8). MOs are analyzed in greater 
detail in 4.2.
that policies proving the egalitarian commitment of the VCP such as the land reform 
implemented in 1954-56 encountered wide popular support (Beresford 2001:208).72 
More precisely, Rigby argues that Socialist systems are “goal-rational” systems.73 He 
observes that “the higher legitimacy  of task-achievement criteria over rule-compliance 
in official evaluation of performance is apparent in every facet of these societies” 
(1990:167). In Vietnam, the role of the SPC in setting detailed production targets for 
each economic unit can be recalled as an example of the preeminence of goals over 
rules. Moreover, the overlapping between state and party structures often led to a con-
fused definition of the responsibilities and procedures in executive agencies, a hazi-
ness that often resulted in high discretionary power of state and party officials. 
3.3.2 The nationalist struggle
Not everybody agrees that Socialist values have been the primary  source of legitima-
tion of the VCP. Indeed, many accounts of Vietnamese history from the anti-colonial 
struggle to the reunification of the country portray the picture of what we have defined 
as a value-rational system based on goals. However, such goals included not only the 
Communist revolution, but also the fight for national liberation. Since the proclama-
tion of the DRV in 1946 by  Ho Chi Minh, the VCP managed to establish itself as the 
most trustworthy advocate and implementer of national liberation ideals, a position of 
supremacy consolidated through successful wars against a series of foreign powers 
both before (France, Japan, the USA) and after (Cambodia, China) reunification in 
1975. Vasavakul (1995:260) remarks that diverging interpretations exist of the impor-
tance of Communist vis-à-vis nationalist discourses in explaining popular support  to 
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72 This is not the case, however, of more radical policies such as the collectivization program that fol-
lowed this land reform.
73 In our terminology, value-rational systems based on goals.
the VCP from the late colonial years to 1975. While some scholars argue that the pre-
dominant normative goals that underpinned the political system were actually  rooted 
in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and in the Socialist  policies supported by the VCP, 
some others contend that the emphasis on the struggle for national liberation and re-
unification was the key strategic choice that granted the party high levels of political 
support. While plenty of empirical material can be collected in support of either thesis, 
it is important to understand that the implementation of the Socialist project and the 
struggle for national liberation were combined by  Vietnamese political elites in a sin-
gle and successful political discourse against  French colonialism first and American 
interventionism later.
3.3.3 Performance
Stephen White (1985) agrees that Socialist systems differ from Western democracies 
in that they  are not based of the enforcement of legal rules. However, he does not 
identify the value-rational mode of legitimation based on outcomes as the preeminent 
mode of legitimation of such systems, and argues instead that the claim to rule is 
based upon other grounds. While traditional and charismatic sources may play  a lim-
ited role, socioeconomic performance, or the “social eudaemonic” mode of legitima-
tion, is the crucial justification of authority in Socialist countries.  White observed that 
“communist regimes do generally provide a high level of social welfare” (1985:463). 
Vietnam fits this picture of a country granting generous welfare provisions to its citi-
zens. Beresford (2001), for instance, highlights how such a comprehensive welfare 
state is closely connected to Socialist egalitarian ideals and to the centrally planned 
economic system based on the cooperative as a basic production unit. She describes 
cooperatives as “highly egalitarian, because minimum supplies of food and security of 
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land tenure were guaranteed, and health, education and other welfare facilities (such 
as child care) were also provided to all members” (2001:211). 
3.3.4 Legitimacy crisis and reform
After 1975, the two ideological pillars that underpinned the political legitimacy of the 
Socialist republic began to wane (Vasavakul 1995:271-4). On one hand, the country 
had successfully defeated all its external enemies and achieved its goal of national re-
unification. On the other, the fragmentation of the international communist movement 
and the deradicalization of political elites in Vietnam shed uncertainty  on the tenets of 
the previously  unquestionable official ideology. For this reason, both the Socialist and 
the nationalist value-rational modes of legitimation based on goals started to come 
under scrutiny, or to be more precise to experience the beginning of a “value change” 
legitimacy crisis. 
The third source of legitimacy, performance, also has to face a problematic outlook 
after reunification. In the early 1980s, it was already becoming clear in the Soviet bloc 
that the countries of the Socialist bloc were experiencing a slowdown in economic 
growth and that the brilliant performance of the industrialization years was a thing of 
the past. The increasing incorporation of Socialist economies in the global capitalist 
system made them more vulnerable to oscillations of global economic performance, 
and the competitive pressures of international markets highlighted the limits and the 
imbalances of Socialist economies (White 1986). In Vietnam, the economic slowdown 
took a particularly severe turn due to country-specific circumstances. Most impor-
tantly, the incorporation of the market  economy of southern Vietnam into the centrally 
planned Socialist system proved to be highly problematic, not least because of the end 
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of international aid to the South, high social resistance to Socialist policies and the 
failure of collectivization projects in the newly acquired territories. Furthermore, state 
capacity was too limited to promote a comprehensive project of institutional develop-
ment aimed to expand the state apparatus in Southern provinces.
 Vietnamese political elites were thus compelled to find a solution to a multi-faceted 
legitimacy  crisis encompassing both normative and eudaemonic elements. What was 
their response? With reference to the national liberation struggle, historical events led 
the county to fight two major international wars in the late 1970s with Cambodia and 
China. The victorious outcomes of these conflicts strengthened the reputation of the 
party  as the ultimate keeper of the territorial integrity  and sovereignty of the nation, 
reinforcing the prestige of the VCP and the army after reunification. However, after 
the end of the military occupation of Cambodia, Vietnam has normalized its diplo-
matic relations with former enemies and has adhered, together with all other Indochi-
nese countries, to the project of regional integration of Association of Southast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). This will arguably  lead to a new international scenario where the 
dangers of military conflicts are minimized, and the nationalist  discourse may  thus 
loose most of its significance in supporting the legitimacy  of VCP rule. As far as the 
Socialist doctrine is concerned, the VCP seems to have adopted a less orthodox offi-
cial ideology. For example, the necessity of the Marxist-Leninist political system was 
justified with references to Ho Chi Minh’s political thought an with a greater emphasis 
on his charismatic figure as the founder of the Socialist Republic rather than recurring 
to ideological grounds.74 The criticism formulated by intellectuals also included con-
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74 See Vasavakul (1995:277).
cerns about the transparency and the representativeness of the system, issues that  were 
partially addressed with the political reforms outlined in 3.1.3. 
If, as White argues, performance is such a pivotal touchstone for legitimate rule in So-
cialist societies, then we should expect those systems to address a performance crisis 
undertaking substantial reform to satisfy the socio-economic expectations of their citi-
zens, or to run the risk of collapsing if they do not. The performance crisis in Vietnam 
was successfully  addressed with the gradual introduction of the market-based meas-
ures analyzed in chapter two, a reform program that  led to sustained economic growth 
especially after its comprehensive adoption in 1986. However, while the introduction 
of market  mechanisms certainly boosted economic performance and thus eudaemonic 
legitimacy, it also laid the foundation for another kind of legitimacy crisis, namely 
Habermas’ crisis of rationality. In the post-reform era, the ability  to ensure social 
equality  is seriously compromised by unavoidable income polarization and class for-
mation that follow the introduction of private property rights. Moreover, the welfare 
system gradually becomes subject to market laws and to the need to restructure the 
state, a process whereby the performance-based legitimacy deriving from high levels 
of social security may start to wane due to increasingly  difficult access to social serv-
ices by the poorer strata of the population.
The extent of the economic, social and political transformation brought about by doi 
moi is such that it  is plausible to suppose important implications in terms of legiti-
macy itself. The state, already  strained by the erosion of the nationalist and Socialist 
foundation of its authority, becomes vulnerable to both a crisis of rationality and a 
significant erosion of the results achieved in terms of performance-based legitimacy. 
Holmes (1997) has identified a new development in the politics of legitimacy in Viet-
53
nam, arguing that legitimation is currently shifting from a value-rational mode based 
on outcomes to a value-rational one based on law. In particular, he sees the attempt of 
the party  to build a modern bureaucracy and to govern less by direct management and 
more through legislative regulation as a proof that such a transition is slowly taking 
place. To some extent, the shift prospected by Holmes is an ineludible step to ensure 
political stability and legitimacy  to the one-party system. While, as we argued, nation-
alist and Socialist ideals may be vulnerable to erosion in the near future, legitimacy 
can certainly not rest on performance alone, since it is virtually impossible to avert all 
kinds of performance crises. The VCP therefore needs a new source of legitimacy, and 
it is trying to find it in legal procedures that encounter popular support without grant-
ing significant political freedoms. However, this transition process is far from com-
plete: ideology and performance are still important sources of legitimation, as they 
once were in the pre-reform period. Chapter five will address this issue by showing 
how MOs have played a crucial role in containing rationality  and performance crises 
during doi moi.
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Chapter Four: State and Society in Vietnam
Since the proclamation of the DRV, and in particular after the end of the First Indo-
china War, Vietnam has drawn the attention of scholars studying the relationship be-
tween states and social groups in Socialist systems. While in the past the DRV was 
portrayed as a typical example of Socialist social organization, many scholars would 
agree that the patterns prevailing today are very different from those of the recent past. 
This chapter analyzes the current literature on state-society relations in Vietnam. In 
the first part, the main issues shaping the academic discussion on the relations be-
tween the state and society  in Vietnam are introduced, with particular emphasis on the 
debate about state capacity vis-à-vis social groups and the coexistence of competing 
perspectives on state-society relations. Following this, two main issues in the Vietnam 
state-society relations scholarship are studied. Section 4.2 is an introduction to MOs 
that contextualizes chapter five’s analysis within the Socialist tradition of mass mobi-
lization and Socialist Vietnam’s own historical legacy. It also covers the debate on the 
emergence of a mobilizational-corporatist  model of state-society relations during doi 
moi.  The last part of this chapter reviews the academic literature addressing the ques-
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tion of the potential development of civil society in Vietnam, including the debate on 
the role of international actors in the politics of development.
4.1 An introduction to state-society relations in Vietnam
While the next two sections of this chapter focus on selected specific issues concern-
ing state-society  relations in Vietnam, this part aims to be an overview of the different 
approaches that have been applied to study  the state and society  in this country. While 
the easier access to Vietnam in recent years has contributed to a growth of academic 
research in the social sciences, a considerable degree of discord still exist about the 
actual relationship between the state and society. After a brief discussion of the basic 
concepts that inform the study of state-society relations, an account of different per-
spectives on the Vietnamese case is attempted.
4.1.1 Studying the state and society
Chapter one has presented a host of different approaches to the study of institutional 
change and the transition to democratic political systems in developing countries.  It 
argued that studying the patterns of the relations between state and society actors is 
crucial to understand variations in institutional settings. In particular, this perspective 
is one that can shed light onto the role of legitimacy in the persistence and change of 
political systems. Before proceeding according to this line of thought, some elabora-
tion of key assumptions and concepts in this field is needed.75
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75  The identification of a “state-society” field or approach should not induce the reader to understand 
the study of state-society relations as a homogeneous field of research in political science. On the con-
trary, several diverging approaches (like some of those outlined in 1.1) include the study of social 
forces and their relations to the state for different reasons and to different extents. The purpose of this 
section, however, is to clarify some notions rather than to survey comprehensively the academic litera-
ture on comparative state-society relations in the developing world. 
First of all, definitions of “state” and “society” must be put forward. The debate on the 
state, its authority, capacity, and autonomy from society in particular has engaged po-
litical science scholars for decades. According to a first perspective,  “an organization, 
composed by numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (execu-
tive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding 
rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social or-
ganizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way” (Migdal 
1988:19). It  is clear that this definition portrays an ideal-type of the state, while the 
states we see in reality may adhere to this model to different degrees. For example, the 
capacity of a state to coordinate the action of its agencies, to formulate and implement 
consistent governance rules may  vary greatly across countries, time or state 
institutions.76 Therefore, it is often useful to disaggregate the state into its various de-
partments, agencies and levels rather than considering it as a monolithic entity.77 Simi-
larly, society is not to be understood as a single cohesive body with unitary goals, 
strategies and tactics, but rather as a multitude of potentially highly  diverse social 
groups ranging from civic associations to economic interests, criminal organizations, 
ethnic clans and religious orders. For this reason, even within the same country  differ-
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76 As far as Vietnam is concerned, section 2.2 has already suggested that significant variation may exist 
in state capacity across the country. For example, inequalities such as the rural-urban and the north-
south divides and high levels of corruption may be a source of uneven implementation of state policies. 
77 Note that this is very important for the issue of political legitimacy too. Different levels of governan-
ce, within the state apparatus, can differ significantly in the level of popular legitimacy they enjoy. The 
work of Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung on Myanmar (2004),  for instance,  shows that local government 
can be more legitimate than the national level in some areas, while in some others the opposite is true. 
This is due to various factors,  among which the quality of local implementation of national policies (in 
her analysis, agricultural policies) is crucial.
ent patterns of state-society relations may exist, according for instance to the policy 
area or the region we consider.78 
Other perspectives offer a more critical view of the state and specifically of the de-
marcation of its boundaries. In his critique of statist approaches, Mitchell (1991) ar-
gues that the main conceptual pitfall of such perspectives is a “subjective” conception 
of the state, which posits the state as a unitary entity that pursues its policy prefer-
ences. Such a view accepts (without demonstrating it) a clear distinction between state 
and society, and takes for granted the state as an actor with its own policy agenda, to a 
significant extent autonomous and insulated from social forces. Mitchell challenges 
this idea of the state as an independent cause of events on the grounds that the state-
society separation is not universal, but an effect  of specific historical processes. He 
argues that we can find different patterns of state-society dynamics according to the 
“realm of practice” (1991:90) we analyze,79  and that state-society demarcation lines 
are not to be conceived as a differentiation between the state and an external entity, 
but as variable lines drawn within such realms. This perspective suggest a more fluid 
demarcation between state and society, and as we will see later in this thesis it is a 
framework that offers better theoretical foundations to account for MO in Vietnam.80
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78  For an example concerning Vietnam, Wischermann (2003) has found that issue-oriented organiza-
tions report a different relationship with state and party authorities according to their region. Members 
of organizations operating in the North (Hanoi) were much more likely to describe their relationship 
with authorities as “problematic” than their colleagues in southern (Ho Chi Minh City based) organiza-
tions.
79 Examples of such realms are foreign policy, schooling and education, the financial sector, healthcare, 
and so forth.
80  Migdal himself in his later work (2001, 2002) seems to recognize the importance of overcoming a 
rigid state-society dichotomy. He elaborates a framework he calls “state-in-society” model, portraying 
society as a melange of diverse organizations, of which the state is one. Such organizations are in con-
stant interaction with one another, a process that leads to a continuous renegotiation and redefinition of 
their boundaries.
Opinions differ as to whether the relations between the state and society  are inherently 
conflictual or potentially  cooperative. The literature on social capital, for example, 
supports a positive relationship  between political participation and institutional per-
formance: the more citizens engage in civic activities and take part in the policy mak-
ing process, the better state institutions will manage to implement good governance 
measures.81 The same is true as far as studies of the positive role of civil society and 
mass mobilization in democratic transitions are concerned.82  Other accounts instead 
see the state as an organization in constant conflict with other social organizations in a 
struggle for “social control” (Migdal 1988), which is the capability to foist the pre-
ferred “rules of the game” on other social actors.83 From this perspective, the imple-
mentation of good policies and the achievement of economic development can only 
occur when social control is solidly concentrated in the hands of the state. When 
authority is dispersed among a plurality of actors pursuing different  political agendas 
state capacity is seriously compromised. 
It is important to remark that academic work from either of the perspectives outlined 
above identifies legitimacy as a critical factor in state-society relations. From one an-
gle, the perception of a legitimate state is a necessary  condition for state institutions to 
work, since it is hard to imagine thriving civic life and genuine political participation 
in the absence of political legitimacy. From another point of view, legitimacy is 
viewed as the “most potent factor in determining the strength of the state” (Migdal 
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81 See for instance Putnam (1994). 
82 See actor-oriented approaches in 1.1
83 Some other authors like Olson (1982) see distributional issues rather than social control as the core of 
state-society conflicts, but offer a similarly antagonistic view of the relations between state and society.
2001:52), a symbolic dimension that ties citizens to the state in a much more inclusive 
way than simple compliance does. 
4.1.2 Vietnam: A strong or a weak state?
Vietnam scholars have studied state-society relations patterns from both perspectives 
outlined above. For example, some studies of social capital in the last years have high-
lighted a thriving associational life, both independent from and initiated by the state.84 
However, most of the Vietnam state-society relations literature analyzes Vietnamese 
state and society  through the lens of a paradigm reminiscent of Migdal’s “social con-
trol” model, where various state agencies are in competition with a host of social 
groups to achieve policy outcomes in accordance with their preferences. Within this 
broad thread of research, diverging opinions can be identified on the issue of the posi-
tion and relative strength of state institutions vis-à-vis society: is Vietnam classifiable 
as a strong or a weak state?85 Migdal himself mentions Socialist Vietnam as an exam-
ple of strong state, ranking it (1988:269) “among the highest in state capabilities” in 
Asia, but other analyses point to the failure of the state to overcome social opposition 
in several areas. According to Kerkvliet (2001), three schools of thought are discerni-
ble in the literature on state-society relations in Vietnam, each offering a different pic-
ture of the role of state and social actors.
The “bureaucratic socialism” (Porter 1993) view argues that the state dominates the 
process of policy-making and implementation, and that the ability of social actors to 
influence this processes is very limited. In this respect, even if after doi moi power 
relations have begun to shift  in favor of an increasingly important role of social 
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84 See for example Dalton et al. (2002), and Dalton and Ong (forthcoming).
85 Koh (2001) for example frames his research on local politics in Hanoi within this debate on state 
capacity in Vietnam.
groups, today’s Vietnam is not substantially  different from the “mono-organizational” 
systems described by Rigby for two reasons. The first is that the state still has the ca-
pacity to penetrate and monitor society  from the national to the grassroots level, exert-
ing a high degree of social control through its numerous agencies, which aim to regu-
late virtually every aspect of Vietnamese social life. Such agencies, according to this 
point of view, operate with a fair degree of consistency  and coordination. Secondly, 
policy decisions are made within the party-state without significant influence from 
social inputs, and the occasional debates on contrasting policy alternatives are better 
understood as intra-party discussion rather than state-society  conflicts. The only extra-
party  forces able to influence policy-making are international factors like economic 
crises. However, this line of reasoning has been attacked from two directions. Firstly, 
the validity  of this model to account for state-society  relations in Vietnam has been 
questioned even with regard to the pre-reform era. Kerkvliet (2005), for example, has 
shown that even in a crucial policy area for a Socialist country like land allocation, 
peasants have managed to oppose successfully the collectivization efforts of the re-
gime although avoiding direct confrontation with state authorities. Moreover, some 
scholars have argued that Vietnamese Socialism has often been more responsive to 
social forces compared with other Marxist-Leninist systems.86 Secondly, as the next 
paragraphs of this section show, in recent years evidence has been mounting that so-
cial actors, co-opted by  or independent from the state, do sometimes have the ability 
to influence public policies.
A second view, the mobilizational-corporatist approach, acknowledges that social ac-
tors have the ability to influence political decisions to a considerable extent, some-
61
86 Brantly Womack (1987),  even acknowledging the authoritarianism of the Socialist regime, describes 
this attitude as “mass regarding”.
times even in decisive ways, but that they are only able to do so within rigid bounda-
ries set up by  the party-state itself. Most scholars see such constraints as embodied by 
party-led MOs such as the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) and the Vietnamese 
Women Union (VWU), and argue that within these institutions the state enjoys a posi-
tion of “structural dominance”. This means that while a certain extent of feedback and 
criticism on specific policies is allowed through “lawful channels”, the leadership role 
of the party  in the political system is never questioned. A crucial implication of this 
model is the marginality  of any associational life without the boundaries of state-
sanctioned institutions. The disparity of resources between MOs and non-state organi-
zations is such that the latter are not comparable with the former as far as their ability 
to influence politics in Vietnam is concerned. The pre-eminence of MOs over non-
state actorness in the politics of development in rural Vietnam is indeed one of the 
premises that  underpin our choice to focus this study on party-led institutions rather 
than supposedly independent actors.87 
From a third point of view, the predominance of the state is not as consolidated as the 
first two perspectives suggest. Rather than characterized by  the subordination of social 
actors to the political power of the party-state, state-society relations are viewed as 
“marked by tolerance, responsiveness, and mutual influence” (Koh 2006:3). Most cru-
cially, the picture of state-society relations suggested by official statements and legis-
lation does not fit with reality, where an “accommodating state” allows substantial 
maneuvering space for state officials and social groups in the implementation of state 
policies, and the possibility  of non-state actors of influencing policy formulation is 
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87 See section 4.2.3 for a review of the debate on recent developments of the mobilizational-corporatist 
model.
acknowledged.88 Regardless of what may be decided by political elites at the national 
level, local officials often have high discretionary power in implementing regulations 
and directives. This leads to high variation in policy implementation across regions, 
levels of government and policy areas. Furthermore, chapter two outlined that Viet-
namese citizens have often engaged in fence-breaking activities in clear breach of of-
ficial regulations. In most cases, the response of state authorities has been accommo-
dating rather than repressive, treating such violations of the law as social experiments 
rather than criminal offences. In contrast  with the first two perspectives, the “accom-
modating state” approach portrays a picture of relatively low antagonism between the 
state and society. Policy divergences between political elites and social groups do oc-
cur, but a good degree of intra-party  democracy  and responsiveness to social pressures 
ensure that policy outcomes are often a compromise between various interests.89 Such 
a bargaining process usually  takes place in a non-adversarial manner, where state in-
stitutions treat social actors as partners whose role is to assist the state in formulating 
and implementing policies rather than criticizing them. 
Finally, a few authors reject the idea that open confrontation with the state is a mar-
ginal phenomenon in contemporary Vietnam. While it is true that the state has created 
a highly  repressive environment towards groups that challenge explicitly the political 
leadership of the VCP, dissident groups have voiced aspirations for a more open po-
litical system. In his review of political dissent in Vietnam, Abuza (2001) argues that 
threats to political stability  have arisen mainly from within the party, as in the case of 
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88 One example of this approach is Fforde’s the work on the economic dimension of the doi moi men-
tioned in 2.1.1.  He argues that economic renovation was not intentionally planned by the regime, but 
that it was a process engendered by the political pressures of some economic actors already present 
before the reform process began. 
89 Unanimity is still often the rule rather than the exception for decision-making in many state bodies.
the Club of Former Resistance Fighters (CFRF) in the late 1980s.90 However, while 
this source of resistance has advocated only moderate changes to the political system 
and has come from well-known party  officials and intellectuals,91 recent developments 
show that confrontational challenges to the state may come from without the party and 
articulate more radical critiques of the party-state.92  This fourth approach to state-
society relations in Vietnam resonates with the academic debate on the emergence of 
civil society in the developing world, which is analyzed later in this chapter.
Following this review of the literature, two considerations merit particular emphasis 
for the study of state and society relations in Vietnam. The first is the need to disag-
gregate the state when studying its relationship with social actors. The state in Viet-
nam is a complex apparatus whose functioning depends on the overlapping of organ-
izational hierarchies, party  lines and inter-personal networks. This organizational 
complexity and the great discretionary power of state officials suggest that significant 
variations exist in how politics is conducted by state and non-state actors across the 
country. Secondly, Kerkvliet’s (2001) characterization of Vietnam’s politics as a clus-
ter of “multiple arenas” is equally relevant. Such arenas can be understood as specific 
policy areas or issues, controversies, social groups or sectors, each with its own dis-
tinctive players, rules of the game and patterns of state-society relations. Both consid-
erations point to the need to look at “low-key politics” and local realities rather than 
official statements and national policy-making, and suggest that generalizing the find-
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90 Founded in 1986 by Ret. Gen. Nguyen Ho, the CFRF expressed strong criticism of the policies for 
the integration of the South after the reunification and of economic policy. While not calling for the 
transition to a democratic system, the group advocated greater transparency within the Party, genuine 
accountability to the National Assembly and greater press freedom. Abuza (2000).
91 Abuza (2000) uses the term “loyal opposition” (2000) to label this kind of dissident activities.
92 See Thayer (2008) for a review of such developments, in particular of the Block 8406 group.
ings of one specific context to the whole country is highly problematic. Following this 
reasoning, our research project focuses on a single arena, namely  the politics of devel-
opment, and selects empirical case studies mostly located in northern Vietnam. 
4.2 Socialist Vietnam and Mobilizational corporatism
The recent history of Vietnam is to a good extent the history  of a Socialist country, of 
the attempt to change a social structure according to the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine. The next paragraphs analyze MOs in Vietnam to show that state-society rela-
tions in this country have been influenced by the Socialist tradition since the estab-
lishment of the DRV. After an introduction of Socialist  cases and Vietnam in particu-
lar, section 4.2.3 addresses the impact of economic and social liberalization on MOs.
4.2.1 Mass mobilization in Socialist countries
The involvement of large numbers of people in military  and political projects has been 
a feature of Communist parties across different geographical regions and historical 
periods. Both before and after the seize of power, Communist political elites have of-
ten identified the mobilization of popular masses as a critical factor for their success. 
The inclination to mass mobilization politics, particularly  clear when Communist in-
surgencies aim to take over a state, stems from both theoretical grounds and historical 
contingencies. Firstly, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine was explicit in designating Com-
munist parties as the leading revolutionary forces against the capitalist system. The 
success of the Socialist project thus depended to a large extent on the ability of Com-
munist parties to motivate popular masses to take part  in the revolutionary struggle. 
The task of channeling the energy of the masses towards the purposes of the proletar-
ian revolution was interpreted by Lenin and his followers as a mandate to “educate” 
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the population according to Socialist precepts (Turley 1980:174). Secondly, such par-
ties have often suffered, al least in the first stages of their activity, from a substantial 
lack of economic and political resources compared to their opponents. For this reason, 
the attempt to involve large crowds can also be understood as a strategy to narrow the 
power gap by expanding the scope of contentious politics.
After the end of the armed revolution, mass mobilization became in many countries 
one of the cornerstones of the attempt to build a Socialist state. Mass mobilization in 
Socialist countries is to be primarily  understood as a mode of propaganda, “perhaps 
not too remote from what we mean by ‘public relations’” (Rigby 1990:70). Often, 
mobilization activities are communication campaigns implemented to achieve some 
sort of collective goal: for example, the production of a certain amount of an agricul-
tural commodity. On other occasions, they call popular masses to action in the wake 
of exceptional circumstances like wars or particularly  ambitious policy programs. 
However, not only  the mass media, but  also a range of other bodies and processes 
were designed to mobilize popular masses, for instance “workplace and other meet-
ings, and the pseudo-democratic processes of elections, meeting of soviets, party  con-
ferences and congresses” (Rigby 1990:70). Large party-led associations of people 
such as MOs, as we will see in the next section, are to be included in this list as well. 
Since the successful implementation of Socialist policies cannot be achieved by coer-
cion alone, such campaigns and activities quickly established themselves as an impor-
tant element of Socialist  political life; at this regard, the relevance of mass mobiliza-
tion politics to the issues of political legitimacy in Socialist countries discussed above 
is crucial. 
66
Mobilization and public participation in Socialist politics is something substantially 
different from the political rights enjoyed by  citizens in democratic systems. Rigby 
(1990:70-1) notes one important  difference between mass politics in Socialist coun-
tries and mass mobilization in Western contentious politics. In the latter, both small 
and large groups of people are involved in political activities, especially in areas of 
their immediate concern.  While in democratic systems such groups have the ability to 
influence the policy-making activity and exert political pressure at the time of the dis-
cussion and formulation of policies, in Socialist systems citizens are only involved 
after the relevant decisions have been taken by political elites. The aim of mass mobi-
lization in Socialist countries is thus of creating goodwill towards official policies by 
informing people of what decisions have been made for them, and of what that means 
in terms of their new responsibilities, costs and benefits.93
4.2.2 The Vietnamese case
Vietnam is an example of a Socialist country where mass mobilization has always 
been of paramount importance for political leaders.94  Arguably, one of the reasons 
why the relationship between the party  and the masses has been so salient in Vietnam 
is that the VCP struggle for power took place in a highly competitive political and 
military environment. In such a context, political elites needed to ensure broad popu-
lar support to succeed in their intents, especially  in rural areas since the country  was 
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93  This characterization, while perhaps useful to describe popular participation in the heyday of the 
mono-organizational system in Vietnam, contrasts with many accounts of current state-society relations 
patterns (see 4.1.2). 
94 Turley (1993b:261) argues that one of the most characteristic legacies of the Vietnames revolution is 
“a political culture which by comparison with the political cultures that have prevailed in most other 
Leninist systems places great value on popular participation as a means to achieve national and revolu-
tionary ends”.
overwhelmingly  agrarian. MOs, established shortly after the foundation of the VCP,95 
were soon to become the main institutional bodies through which political leaders 
managed the relationship between the party  and the masses. In the first  years of their 
activity, MOs and other “liberation associations” complemented the formal structure 
of government “to organize functional groups in support of Party objectives” (Turley 
1980:180). At the end of the military emergency, each MO was supposed to represent 
one specific social group  in the party-led political system, and it was the only allowed 
associational form for members belonging to such groups. The four main MOs, for 
example, are the Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU), Vietnam Farmers’ Union (VFU), 
the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (CYU), and the Vietnam General Confed-
eration of Labor (VGCL). All MOs are grouped under a larger umbrella organization 
called Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), which has the responsibility  to coordinate the 
action of its members according to policy  lines set up by the VCP.96 Other organiza-
tions have been set up  to represent social sectors such as war veterans, intellectuals, 
religious and professional groups and solidarity associations.97
The functions of MOs in Vietnam are to a large extent comparable to those of mass 
mobilization institutions in other Socialist countries. This means that they have been a 
powerful channel for the VCP to communicate with selected social groups, thereby 
connecting the masses to the party. Like elsewhere in the Socialist world, mass mobi-
lization has been understood as a way of persuading the population to support party 
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95 The establishment of the most prominent MOs predates national independence, and it is roughly si-
multaneous to the official foundation of the VCP. Although their names changed several times from 
their establishment, most of the largest MOs were formally set up in the early 1930s (Sakata 2006:51).
96 Not only MOs are members of the VFF. The Front also includes the VCP itself, the People’s Army, 
prominent individuals, and other organizations that do not necessarily have a large membership.
97 The VFF counted in 2004 a membership of 40 associations (reported in Sakata 2006, Annex 1).
policies, through the “active involvement in the implementation of the decisions made 
by the party” (Turley  1995:260).98 Additionally, for a political elite keen on maintain-
ing the legitimacy acquired during the national liberation struggle, MOs where a cru-
cial tool to track popular sentiment and policy  attitudes in key  social groups (Porter 
1993:87). As a matter of fact, MOs were understood as a venue of representation of 
social groups where, to a limited extent, criticism of local authorities could be voiced. 
This suggests that MOs were intended to played a role, if a very mild one, of monitor-
ing local government activity, and they have been used by central party cadres as tools 
to identify  inefficient and corrupt local administrators.99  Finally, the VFF has also 
played an important role in the process of selecting and endorsing candidates for elec-
tions at various administrative levels, including those for the National Assembly. Such 
a broad range of functions of MOs was carried out through various activities like 
regular meetings of executive committees (including congresses for the selections of 
officials), sessions where members could learn and enquire about policies concerning 
their everyday life, and more specific communication campaigns aimed at mass mobi-
lization for specific objectives (Sakata 2006:51-2).
As far as the organizational structure of MOs is concerned, they  are closely  linked to 
the supervision of the VCP. The party  has imposed the requirement that MOs activities 
abide by the general policy guidelines approved by the VCP, and takes part directly  to 
the management of MOs through two institutional channels (Porter 1993:88). The first 
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98  In the case of the CYU then, a related and more specific purpose of mass mobilization was the re-
cruitment and training of the future cadres of the VCP.
99 This statement should be qualified in two important ways.  Firstly, the extent of criticism allowed has 
been a very limited one. So for example, during MOs activities and in other popular participation ven-
ues participants were allowed to express their complaints towards officials at the lowest administrative 
level, but not to criticize party decisions or party members at higher hierarchical levels. Secondly, as the 
next section shows, such mechanisms of control, besides being weak, often did not work as effectively 
as national party leaders had planned them to do.
is the consolidated tradition of appointing high-ranking party  members (usually mem-
bers of the VCP Central Committee) to the positions of president of the largest MOs 
and the VFF. Secondly, party chapters working under the direct supervision of the cen-
tral party leadership  operate in all MOs. Such party sections have the responsibility  to 
appoint “party groups” within the executive committees of each MOs. Most MOs, es-
pecially the largest ones, have a four-layer structure from national to provincial, dis-
trict and commune level. My fieldwork (see next chapter) has revealed that, in addi-
tion to this already extensive network, MOs sometimes have staff responsible for the 
village level as well, which allows a very comprehensive coverage of the territory un-
til the grassroots level.
4.2.3 Mass organizations, doi moi and corporatism
In spite of its crucial role within the Socialist polity, the Vietnamese mobilizational 
system and the MOs in particular have suffered from recurring crises. Most impor-
tantly, this system often failed in achieving its goal of a genuine mass political partici-
pation. Turley, for example, notes that while during the anti-colonial struggle public 
participation was fostered by a “resistance ethic” (1980:181), the VCP encountered 
serious problems in this sector after 1954, when the military effort of the First Indo-
china War was over. On one hand, the unresponsiveness of most public officials to 
citizens’ demands and their indifference to popular input and feedback led to a general 
disillusionment among popular masses, and a decline in participation in people’s 
councils.100 On the other hand, MOs lost most of their power due to the tendency of 
administrative and party organs to monopolize political decisions in all public 
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100 Turley (1980:181-2).
venues.101 In the wake of a new military conflict  for the reunification of the country, 
political elites tried to address this crisis in the attempt of restore the resistance spirit. 
While in some important ways the scope of popular participation was reduced,102 the 
VCP launched a mass campaign to criticize party cadres, an important innovation 
since public criticism was then only allowed among party peers. For our research, two 
important points should be emphasized with reference to Turley’s analysis of the early 
relationship  between the VCP and Vietnamese masses. The first is that it  corroborates 
the above argument that political elites have always perceived this bond as a crucial 
one, on which the prospects of their own long-term survival largely depend on. Sec-
ondly, the analysis suggests that such a relationship is even more important in times of 
exceptional challenges, when the party attempts to capitalize on mass mobilization to 
achieve major political goals.  
The renovation process started in the mid-1980s is one of such watershed develop-
ments. Indeed, at the beginning of this decade MOs were facing a crisis similar to that 
they  experienced twenty years before. Porter (1993:90-1) reports that  MOs were 
widely  considered as excessively  bureaucratized and undemocratic, their workforce 
underpaid, lacking motivation and often corrupt. According to many  party members, 
seriously concerned about the derelict state of their mobilizational apparatus, MOs 
were grossly failing in fulfilling their mandate to transmit the opinion of the masses to 
the VCP. In times of radical economic and social changes, the rehabilitation of MOs 
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101  Turley mentions the case of the peasants association (now VFU) to illustrate the decline of MOs 
during the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Shortly after the completion of the land reform, most of the 
prerogatives once held by the VFU were taken over by the cooperative system, specifically by organs 
such as production brigades and cooperative management boards.  The lack of support for MOs from 
VCP cadres, fearful of the potentially destabilizing role of continued mass participation in everyday 
politics, led to the decline or disbandment of such organizations.
102  In particular,  several responsibilities of people’s councils were transferred to administrative bodies 
(Turley1980:185).
was thus a priority in the debate on political reform. In particular, a review of the lit-
erature reveals that two main guidelines have informed the renewal of MOs in the late 
1980s. The first one is the introduction of more democratic electoral processes for the 
election of MOs officials, with the aim of giving members a greater say in the selec-
tion of their representatives.103 This and communication campaigns to encourage de-
bate and feedback from the masses were provisions aimed at making MOs more re-
sponsive to their memberships. Secondly, steps were taken to grant MOs a substantial 
freedom from local administrative apparatuses, although not  from the party (Porter 
1993:91). This was decided to enable MOs to develop programs closer to the needs of 
their members, and to reinvigorate and expand their memberships. The commitment 
of the VCP to revitalize and empower MOs resulted not only  in a modified institu-
tional environment within the party-state, but  also in a partial redefinition of their 
roles vis-à-vis their members. In particular, many  agree that  MOs are now embracing 
“more practical socio-economic development activities” (Sakata 2006:56), more cen-
tered on the needs of their members than on the achievement of ideological goals.104
Interestingly, a similarly mobilizational model has been extended to some of the new 
social groups empowered by economic reform. Thayer (1995) argues that doi moi has 
provided opportunities for a much more lively and varied associational life than the 
model of mono-organizational Socialism can describe. However, he remarks that 
“many of the new groups and associations, while not wholly  autonomous from the 
state and therefore not purely  popular, are in fact ‘semi-governmental’ if not ‘quasi-
governmental’” (Thayer 1995:52). According to some scholars, this trend points to the 
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103  At this regard, the first congress of the VFU in 1997 and the Sixth Trade Union Congress in 1998 
can be mentioned as an example of the renewal introduced by such electoral amendments. See Turley 
(1993:263) and Porter (1993:92-3). 
104 This issue will be examined in depth throughout the next chapter.
emergence of a model of state-society relations that presents important similarities to 
the corporatist experience of many  East Asian “developmental states”.105 Stromseth 
(2003), for example, sees a corporatist  model in how state-business relations are man-
aged, while Jeong (1997) argues that corporatist  tendencies are consolidating between 
the state and a number of social sectors. According to this view, “the VCP has deliber-
ately and consistently sought to institutionalize state corporatism since the early stages 
of economic reform” (Jeong 1997:154). This strategy, of which the restructuring of 
existing MOs is an important aspect, is favored by political elites also because it  is 
consistent with the successful mobilizational model adopted since the early days of 
the VCP. My own research, focusing on MOs and their renovation, can also be 
counted within this thread of research on the emergence of a Vietnamese “mobiliza-
tional corporatism”.
4.3 Is there a civil society in Vietnam?
The issue of civil society development is highly discussed not only in academic com-
munities worldwide, but also in policy circles and in the popular press. As we show 
after an introduction on the concept of civil society and its relationship with develop-
ment initiatives run by international donors and NGOs, Vietnam scholars have been 
no exception in developing a debate on an emerging Vietnamese civil society.
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105  Although different definitions of corporatism exist, we can understand it here as a system of state-
society relations where the state grants a privileged status to some interest groups (often, a monopoly of 
the representation of their own category’s interests) in exchange for the commitment to abide by certain 
institutional rules or policies.
4.3.1 Civil society and international aid
In spite of the popularity of the concept of civil society in the political science com-
munity, some scholars have argued that this notion has not  been clearly  defined.106 
Rather than giving a full account of different theoretical perspectives, it will suffice 
here to consider civil society as that “third sector” of public life including voluntary 
associations other than state and market actors.107 More relevant to the purposes of 
this thesis is to clarify briefly  the connection between civil society  and institutional 
change. It is highly problematic to summarize in a couple of sentences such an im-
pressive body of literature, but for the sake of simplicity we can identify two paths 
through which the beneficial effect of civil society  on institutional performance and 
democratization is supposed to work. First, the literature on social capital and trust 
argues that associational life favors a process of socialization at the individual level. 
civil society  is thus understood as a “school of democracy” that develops virtues con-
ducive to good government, such as a strong civic culture, tolerance and cooperative 
behavior. Second, the value of civil society  lies in some pivotal functions that  NGOs 
are able to fulfill. 108  Some of them are directly related to democratic and civil ad-
vancement, as it is for their functions of channeling social demands, fostering the in-
clusion of underprivileged groups in the public sphere, serving as “watchdogs” of 
government activity and critical awareness in the public debate. Some others instead 
are more related to a matter of “governance” rather than democratization. NGOs are 
supposed to provide citizens with a wide range of social services that no other actor is 
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106 See Amory (2004:9-12) for a review of the debate on the definition of the concept of civil society.
107  This definition thus includes non-profit non-state associations and networks of various kinds, such 
as civic groups, NGOs, and service providers like hospitals and schools. 
108 See for example Hannah (2007:7) for an illustration of different civil society roles.
willing or able to deliver, in particular for those sectors of the population neglected by 
state and market logics. Furthermore, their small size, technical knowledge and prox-
imity to target groups of such services constitute a “comparative advantage” allowing 
them to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency.
A good share of the literature on the emergence of civil society in Vietnam delves into 
the politics of development, especially on projects carried out in partnerships involv-
ing international donors and NGOs. In recent years and during the 1990s in particular 
(the so-called “development decade”) Vietnam has seen a rapid and extraordinary in-
crease of the presence of international NGOs and aid organizations, now active in an 
impressive number of development projects throughout  the country. The aspect of 
civil society  related to democratization processes recalled above, working both 
through individual socialization and critical social functions, has heavily informed the 
approach followed by most international donors in their policies for the underdevel-
oped world.  If we look at how international donors have implemented this approach 
in practice, we find that the commitment to “manufacture civil society from the out-
side” has followed in recent years three major patterns (Howell and Pearce, 
2001:102-11). The first one, institution and capacity building, aims at developing local 
civil societies with activities like the establishment of research centers, the provision 
of technical advice and training, and the advocacy for a regulatory  framework encour-
aging non-state agency  through various forms of liberalization. A second path in-
volves creating partnerships among the four main actors on the development scene, 
namely the state, market, civil society and international donors. Coalitions of this kind 
are set up on the basis that such actors, although often substantially different, share a 
set of common goals and should be considered as complementary partners rather than 
75
antagonistic competitors. A third strategy  involves the direct provision of various 
forms of funding in support of activities carried out by civil society organizations. Fi-
nancing areas can include, for example, offices and equipment, advocacy activities 
and campaigning material, or simply the payment of salaries to some NGOs officials.
This idea that civil society can be introduced by the concerted efforts of a multitude of 
international actors, and that it can, in turn, lead to economic development, better gov-
ernance and democratization has been attacked from several directions. The first line 
of critique concerns the questionability of the link between civil society  and desirable 
political outcomes.109 Secondly, many view the development of civil society  as an en-
dogenous historical process that cannot be achieved through an imposition from the 
outside of political models worked out in advance.110 For this reason, the intervention 
of the international community  is likely  to produce a melange of small organizations 
of dubious efficiency  rather than a large, vigorous and independent civil society able 
to fulfil the critical roles outlined earlier. Third, evidence from development projects 
suggests that the partnership model cannot be universally  applied. Countless episodes 
of subtle confrontation or open conflict among economic actors, state institutions and 
NGOs in developing countries show that the politics of development is often an arena 
that resembles a zero-sum game rather that a favourable environment for cooperation. 
Finally, some doubt that civil society is a concept  applicable to the analysis of non-
Western societies, which may have very different attitudes from those prevailing in the 
West about what the relations between the state and society should be. This is also re-
lated to the difficult operationalization of civil society, since international donors often 
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109 See for example Armony (2004).
110 From the same angle, other key goals of international donors and NGOs (most importantly, democ-
ratization) are considered equally unattainable. 
have difficulties in identifying what organizations constitute civil society in social and 
cultural context they are hardly familiar with.
4.3.2 The prospects for civil society in Vietnam
Studies of civil society in Vietnam have focused in particular on the attribution to con-
temporary Vietnamese associational life of the two crucial civil society  features out-
lined above. The first one is related to the critical role that civil society is supposed to 
play  vis-à-vis the government, and asks whether civil society in Vietnam is genuinely 
autonomous from the state. From this perspective, the independence from party  and 
state organs is a constituting and necessary element of civil society. As Heng (2004) 
observes, this issue parallels the discussion on the “strength” of the Vietnamese state 
detailed in 4.1.2. The prevailing view at this regard is that “the obvious reality of the 
continuing dominance of the Communist Party” (Lux & Straussman 2004) in the so-
cial realm cannot be denied. For this reason, Vietnam is experiencing a “state-led civil 
society” more similar to the Chinese model (Frolic 1997) than to patterns prevailing in 
the West. However, this is not to imply that the thriving associational life described in 
the above sections, not being classifiable as an ideal-type of civil society, should be 
belittled. In fact, even if the scope of action for VNGOs is restricted, studies suggest 
their incipient ability to influence policy-makers in some areas. For example, Gray 
(2004) illustrates the case of the Vietnamese NGO Towards Ethnic Women to argue 
that such organizations have acquired the ability to lobby government officials at dif-
ferent levels, providing reliable information and consultancy. Wischermann’s 
(2003:880-2) study of issue-oriented organizations also shows that several VNGOs 
consider themselves to a good extent autonomous from the state. Moreover, some 
authors criticize the focus of these studies on development-related VNGO, arguing 
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that civil society challenges to the state are already emerging in Vietnam in different 
forms, such as rural unrest (Luong 2005), religious associations (Abuza 2001, chapter 
6) or even open political contestation (Thayer 2008).
A different thread of research is more concerned with what we have called “govern-
ance” activities rather than with VNGOs autonomy from the state. From this angle, 
the key development involving VNGOs in authoritarian countries is not  only their 
contribution to democratization processes, but also their role in promoting a more ef-
ficient and effective governance, especially for the most deprived sectors of the popu-
lation. For example, Hannah (2007) advocates the adoption of a less restrictive notion 
of civil society  to account for non-Western environments. In non-Western cultures 
civil society could assume different institutional settings but provide similar services 
to their members. This is the case of Vietnam, where mobilizational-corporatist or-
ganizations and government-inspired VNGOs, although not independent from the 
state, can successfully  fulfill some of the functions of civil society in Western context, 
especially the provision of welfare services. However, the choice of what aspects and 
activities should be considered as the core of civil society, and what others instead 
could change according to the socio-cultural context is not addressed exhaustively. 
Salemink (2003) shows with the analysis of a Vietnamese example of an INGO devel-
opment project  that this aspect of civil society  (the “governance” functions) can be in 
contrast with the role of civil society as a harbinger of democracy. In the politics of 
development, he argues, the welfare goals of international donors can often be 
achieved without the presence of an independent and vibrant civil society, since the 
work of existing quasi-governmental associations in partnership with INGOs is often 
successful. Moreover, the presence of INGOs itself has the ironic effect of inhibiting 
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the development of a critical awareness among local civil society organizations, since 
such international actors already fulfill similarly critical functions.
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Chapter Five: Mass Organizations between Change and 
Continuity
In the previous chapters, this thesis has reviewed the theoretical frameworks and the 
historical developments necessary  to contextualize our research project. It is now pos-
sible to go through the empirical material we have gathered in support  of our main 
argument, and more specifically to test the six research hypotheses introduced in 
1.4.2. As outlined earlier, this thesis argues that the restructuring of MOs is a crucial 
aspect of the dynamics of change and continuity in Vietnam, and of the evolution of 
political legitimacy over the doi moi period. In particular, MOs have been revitalized 
so that they could maintain their role as the privileged channel for the management of 
state-society relations. We argue that  the reform of MOs analyzed in chapter four has 
transformed them into hybrid institutions, not readily classifiable as civil society or 
state organizations. Before studying the implications of this transformation for the 
academic debates introduced throughout this thesis in chapter six, this chapter shows 
how exactly  MOs can be understood both as civil society actors and state agencies, as 
the incarnation of both socio-political liberalization and contiguity  with an authoritar-
ian regime. While the first section of this chapter focuses on the new roles of MOs, to 
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a large extent comparable those of civil society actorness, the second part studies other 
features more reminiscent of MOs’ past roles as party-controlled organs.
5.1 Mass organizations as civil society actors
MOs have changed substantially since the beginning of economic reform. Our hy-
potheses claim that this change is recognizable in three main dimensions. First, the 
intent of the VCP to turn MOs into agencies closer to the needs of their constituencies 
has transformed them in providers of welfare services. The targets of such services are 
those disadvantaged sectors of the population increasingly neglected both by market 
and state actors. Secondly, MOs, especially  active in the politics of rural development, 
have been operating with an approach closely reminiscent of the “partnership model” 
adopted by  international NGOs and donors. Another aspect  of this inclusive model of 
action is the function of MOs as venues for discussion, especially for population 
groups previously excluded from the public debate. Thirdly, the “comparative advan-
tage” that  NGOs are supposed to have compared with state actors is manifested by 
MOs in a number of their features, such as their proximity to and knowledge of the 
target groups of welfare services, their increased technical expertise following the co-
operation with foreign actors, the employment of motivated volunteer staff, and a 
higher degree of transparency as compared with state bureaucracies.
5.1.1 Welfare service providers
The fact  that MOs are currently much more involved in development activities than 
they  were in the past is rather uncontroversial. The above literature review has shown 
that MOs’ reform has involved a redefinition of their tasks aimed to achieve a closer 
fit between MOs’ action and the needs of their constituencies. My interviews in Hanoi 
81
have revealed that MOs are involved in exactly the same policy  areas where INGOs 
and international donors are operating. Such areas include all sort of poverty  allevia-
tion programs and projects aimed at improving social conditions in rural Vietnam. 
One of my interviewees,111 for example, is a project  manager in a special unit of the 
VWU established in 2002, called Center for Women Development (CWD), in charge 
of designing and implementing projects in various areas, ranging from vocational 
training to human trafficking. Among the activities they  are carrying out some are 
tackling abuse on women, a sensitive issue in Vietnamese society, and innovative 
measure such as shelters, hotlines, and counseling groups for abused women are being 
implemented. Other MOs’ welfare activities mentioned in the interviews carried out 
include virtually all issues in rural development, such as income generation, health-
care, childcare, illiteracy, professional training and entrepreneurship development, en-
vironmental preservation, disabilities, gender, distance adoptions and so forth. 
Despite the consensus on the new welfare roles of MOs, little has been written about 
their specific contribution to each of the stages of development projects.112 According 
to my respondents, MOs are playing a very active role in most steps of such 
projects.113  During the pre-feasibility stage, when a problem is identified and some 
preliminary analyses are carried out, MOs work together with INGOs and donors to 
define the scope of the project. Sometimes, MOs themselves contact such foreign ac-
tors with project proposals, and on other occasions they are contacted by INGOs and 
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111 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 22/07/08
112  In designing my interview guide,  I have distinguished among six stages of project management: 
identification of the problem, design-preparation, financing, implementation, monitoring-evaluation, 
and dissemination of results.
113 Interviewees from MOs were asked to comment on the role their organization or unit played in each 
stage of the project management, while INGOs officials were asked to assess MOs’ contribution to such 
stages.
donors for advice about the selection of the project site. In the project formulation 
phase, MOs are crucial in identifying the actual beneficiaries of the project, which is 
made possible thanks to their superior knowledge of their members and of the popula-
tion in general. Moreover, MOs also contribute in estimating the resources needed to 
achieve the project goals, although some of the interviewees remarked that costs esti-
mates are often inflated and need therefore to be reassessed. Financing, or the securing 
of the economic resources needed for the project, is usually a responsibility  of donors 
and INGOs. A partial exception is the already mentioned CDW of the VWU, which 
funds a limited extent of its development projects through the revenues of a small 
hospitality management activity in Hanoi. 
The implementation of the project is the stage where the contribution of MOs is, in the 
view of all interviewees, indispensable. This is due to the far-reaching structure of 
MOs,114 essential to target population groups who often live in dispersedly populated 
rural areas. MOs staff is in charge of implementing most of the development projects, 
even though many lament the need of comprehensive training for all staff levels (es-
pecially the lower ones) before the beginning of each project. During and after im-
plementation, processes of monitoring and evaluation are also needed. However, IN-
GOs and donors rarely trust MOs with such responsibilities. The first reason for this is 
that many fear that MOs’ staff may have vested interests in evaluating their own work, 
especially as far as the deployment of financial resources is concerned. Secondly, the 
expertise needed to carry out final evaluations and monitoring is often not available 
among MOs’ staff. Finally, the dissemination of the projects results is another area 
where MOs are active. This is especially the case for informing the rural population 
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114 See 5.2.1.
about the results to create awareness of the benefits introduced by  the project. MOs 
are thus emerging as the main providers of welfare services in rural Vietnam, and like 
NGOs elsewhere in the world they are addressing the need of those sectors of the 
population neglected by both market and state actors.115 
5.1.2 An inclusive model of governance
MOs fit well into the cooperative, non-adversarial model of governance that interna-
tional donors and NGOs are promoting for their projects in developing countries. All 
the respondents interviewed stated that their projects are never carried out by a single 
agency, but rather formulated and implemented by a constellation of actors. These in-
clude international donors, INGOs, MOs (most frequently, the VWU, the WFU, the 
CYU, and occasionally associations of teachers and veterans members of the VFF), 
Vietnamese NGOs such as research centers, and local offices of national agencies 
such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Develop-
ment. All projects also involve, if only to a limited extent, local authorities of the state 
and the party, most notably  People’s Committees. This does not imply that the coop-
eration among such a plurality of actors is always smooth and that all parties involved 
share the same vision and goals. Some of the INGOs officials I have interviewed re-
port that, despite an overall fruitful working partnership, minor issues of conflict exist 
in their cooperation with MOs-for example about  compensation matters or the intro-
duction of practices MOs are not accustomed to. As the next section argues, diver-
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115 Some could contest that the poor in rural areas are being neglected by the state in Vietnam. Indeed, 
reducing the “development gap” between urban and rural areas has been repeatedly announced as a 
policy priority by the VCP elites during the last years. However,  funds for rural development often in-
clude infrastructural and economic projects that do not benefit the whole population proportionally. 
Moreover, as shown in 5.1.3, government programs specifically targeted at the provision of welfare 
services for the most disadvantaged strata of the population often present low levels of effectiveness 
and inclusiveness.
gences between INGOs and local authorities can be more substantial and more diffi-
cult to reconcile. 
Interestingly, cooperation among MOs can be problematic as well. Some of our inter-
viewees for instance argue that the lack of coordination among MOs has been an im-
portant limitation in some projects. The example of a microcredit project in Quang 
Ngai province, funded by an INGOs and implemented by the VWU, illustrates this 
point clearly (CARE International 2001). The evaluation report of this project found 
continued and strong support by  the VWU, with the exception of one district where 
the local branch of the VWU was only recently established and thus institutionally 
weak. However, the same report  reads that the CYU “at no time was supportive of the 
project implementation aim”, because it had “an alternative project with strong eco-
nomic benefits for the [Youth] Brigade and probably  for the Commune” (CARE Inter-
national 2001:7). This suggests not only that the institutional environment can differ 
markedly according to the district  chosen for project implementation, but also that 
MOs may not always qualify as a suitable partner for development projects.
The inclusiveness of the approach followed by MOs is not limited to the cooperation 
among several actors, but also lies in their role of providing a venue for political par-
ticipation for their members. According to the experience of my interviewees, in MOs 
meetings members feel free to speak up and express their opinion on a range of issues 
that affect  their daily lives. In rural areas, such venues are often the only  opportunity 
where citizens, especially those belonging to underrepresented groups, can participate 
to the management of their community. This dimension of MOs agency is particularly 
evident in some gender projects implemented by INGOs in Vietnam, in which the 
VWU has been the main partner. The project called “A Women Caravan” by the Ital-
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ian NGO GVC is one of such examples.116 This project  targeted a particularly disad-
vantaged group, ethnic minority women in a northern province, aiming to give them 
the opportunity to discuss issues of gender and equality, such as the allocation of 
household duties, domestic violence, and even civil rights. The VWU implemented 
this project in several villages, organizing workshops where minority women could 
share their experiences and propose solutions to the problems they face in everyday 
life.  This example shows that MOs can also fulfill one important function of civil so-
ciety associations, which is fostering the participation of marginal groups in civic 
life.117
5.1.3 A comparative advantage
The interviews I have carried out suggest that MOs are usually  able to deliver more 
effective welfare services in comparison with state actors. This is reminiscent of the 
“comparative advantage” that civil society organizations enjoy in some governance 
activities. A clear differentiation between MOs and other state bodies emerges not 
only from the opinion expressed by  INGOs officials about their own working experi-
ence,118 but also about their perception of the attitudes of the population towards MOs. 
More precisely, it is possible to identify four reasons that explain higher levels of MOs 
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116 Information regarding this project was collected during two interviews in Hanoi with GVC officials, 
carried out on 21/08/08. A short filmed report with a description of the projects and its main achieve-
ments is available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bW4RimOS6N8.
117 An interviewee of an INGOs with decades of experience in development in Vietnam has highlighted 
that, occasionally, MOs may tend to exclude non-members from the provision of services.  This is due 
to the attitudes of some cadres of the organization,  who interpret their mandate rather conservatively. 
However, such a problem can relatively easily be solved since MOs have been quite flexible when 
asked to change their modus operandi. Interview carried out in Hanoi, 25/08/08.
118 All but one of the interviewees agreed on this point. Contrary to the opinion of his colleagues I have 
interviewed, an official of an INGO working on disabled rehabilitation projects in Vietnam claimed that 
no meaningful distinction between MOs and other state agencies is possible. This is not only because of 
their dependence from the VCP, an issue developed in 5.2.2, but also because their performance is not 
dissimilar from state actors in development projects.  When working with MOs, the official said, you 
should expect to face the same difficulties you encounter in other state bodies,  including corruption, 
wasteful resource management and lack of flexibility.
performance in development projects. The first one, described by an official of an 
American NGO working on childcare issues,119 is that MOs staff has a moral drive 
impossible to find elsewhere in the Vietnamese public administration. He explains that 
MOs officials have a commitment to their job and a sense of mission that clearly  dis-
tinguish them from the personnel in other state bodies, where indifference to devel-
opment projects is often the rule. For example, similarly to what happens in civil soci-
ety  associations, staff at the lowest level in MOs is often made up by  volunteers. The 
officials of the Italian NGO GVC subscribe to this view, claiming that this is one of 
the reasons why they consider only MOs as full partners of their initiatives. It is a very 
different relationship from the one they have with local authorities: the most helpful 
thing that  the government is able to do, they  argue, is providing the necessary authori-
zations and refraining from misconduct.
Secondly, MOs are often perceived as having fewer vested interests than other party-
state institutions. MOs are operating under the constraints of limited budgets, and, un-
like local authorities, they do not usually take part in activities where substantial eco-
nomic interests are at  stake. For this reason, even when specific government programs 
are available, MOs are often able to provide similar ones closer to the needs of the 
majority  of the population. State-run microfinance programs are a good example of 
the limitations of government action. On one hand, microcredit offered within gov-
ernment programs is not financially sustainable. This is because, being often per-
ceived as charity rather than credit, they apply unsustainably low interest rates and are 
plagued with high default rates. On the other hand, loans offered by the government 
sometimes tend to exclude important  groups. For example, some sectors of the popu-
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119 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 13/08/08.
lation may find it much more difficult than others to provide the guarantees necessary 
to qualify  for credit.120 Moreover, citizens with stronger links to the local party hierar-
chies may be unfairly privileged.121
Secondly, in spite of the persisting capacity  constraints, MOs are generally perceived 
to have a higher degree of technical expertise than other state counterparts in devel-
opment projects. Several INGOs respondents we have asked mention the fact that 
MOs are more competent than local authorities in development projects as one of the 
main reasons why they choose them as partners for their initiatives. Often, previous 
working experience with MOs staff has revealed a much more flexible approach than 
the one found with government bodies. Most importantly  though, it  is precisely  the 
interaction between MOs and international actors that has contributed to a dramatic 
increase in MOs capacity in the last years. Most development projects formulated by 
international NGOs and donors include a training process to enable MOs officials to 
carry  out the tasks required, thus contributing to the development of a know-how that 
remains at the MOs’ disposal after the conclusion of the project. This differentiation 
between MOs and other government bodies is also confirmed by the fact that occa-
sionally MOs require their international partners an exclusive relationship, fearing that 
the involvement of inefficient government institutions could harm the prestige of the 
organization.122 
Finally, the function of including marginalized sectors of the population in the public 
debate is also crucial to explain why MOs activities are evaluated as more effective by 
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120 See for instance Flyers and Vu (2002) on the difficulty experienced by female-headed households to 
access public credit.
121 According to a report (Caseley 2000), for example, this is the case of the People’s Committee credit 
groups run in several communes in Lai Chau Province.
122 Reported by an official of an international NGO in an interview carried out on 21/08/08.
INGOs officials. More generally, the attitudes of the population towards MOs are dif-
ferent from those held towards other state officials. A local expert of Vietnamese soci-
ety, for example, argues that  there is much more goodwill towards MOs than other 
state institutions.123 This is due to several reasons, among which the egalitarian struc-
ture of MOs at the grassroots level is of primary importance. At the lowest hierarchi-
cal level, MOs are a sort of forum where members identify MOs official as their peers, 
and feel therefore free to express their opinions on any issues. A relationship of trust 
between MOs staff and members develops in an environment much different from 
other government venues, where the demarcation between state (or party) and people 
is much clearer and mutual suspicion between officials and people higher. Greater 
trust and accessibility increase the legitimacy of MOs, and therefore the commitment 
of local populations to the success of development projects implemented by them.
5.2 Mass organizations as government agencies
MOs have not only  been an example of the social liberalization and welfare achieve-
ments of doi moi, but also an effective tool in the hands of the VCP to reinforce its 
control of Vietnamese society. From this angle, far from articulating civil society criti-
cal discourses, MOs have contributed to the persistence of an authoritarian polity  in 
Vietnam. Our hypotheses identify  three dimensions where MOs are more easily com-
parable with government agencies than civil society actors. First, MOs still retain the 
feature of a government bureaucracy. They are large and hierarchical organizations 
funded by  the state and legally acknowledged as a part of the civil service. Second, 
MOs are still carrying out a function of social control on behalf of the party-state. In 
particular, their involvement in the monitoring of state policies’ implementation and in 
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123 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 19/08/08.
election processes is important aspects at this regard. Finally, MOs are in a subordi-
nate position vis-à-vis the VCP, despite the considerable operational autonomy they 
enjoy. The party’s control of MOs is arguably as tight as it was before recent MOs in-
stitutional amendments. 
5.2.1 Bureaucratic features
Even after the reform measures introduced during doi moi, MOs still retain some fea-
tures that differentiate them from civil society associations. The first of such charac-
teristics is their large size and hierarchical structure. Although it has not been possible 
to estimate the total workforce employed by each organization, MOs do not feature 
the nimble and flexible structure typical of most NGOs. MOs, especially  the larger 
ones like the CYU and the VWU, usually  have an extraordinary number of offices 
throughout the country, including all provinces and virtually  all of the districts and the 
communes.124 Moreover, the case studies analyzed show that often MOs are present 
with informal structures even at  the village level, where the staff is typically employed 
on a voluntary basis. Some of the people I have interviewed identify  this feature as the 
main asset of MOs in development projects. When asked about the reasons for choos-
ing MOs as partners, a recurring answer of INGOs officials is that working with them 
is the only  possible way to reach their target groups. This is due precisely to the over-
arching network at the disposal of MOs, a structure that enables them to get in contact 
with their millions of members. Moreover, Sakata (2006) reports that the legal status 
of MOs staff is also equivalent  to that of state bureaucracies. The cadres of MOs, from 
the national to the commune level, have the status of civil servants. This means, for 
example, that “they receive salary from the National Treasury at the same level as ad-
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124 For a summary of organizational features of MOs and their presence on the territory, see Do (1996). 
ministrative officials” (2006:55). Indeed, most of the budget of MOs is funded by the 
state.125
5.2.2 Social monitoring
The analysis of the historical functions of MOs carried out in 4.2.2 has shown that 
MOs have had a crucial role in allowing the VCP to monitor key social groups, and in 
implementing the policies decided by the central government. This role of social con-
trol on behalf of the political elites has not weakened following institutional reform. 
On the contrary, MOs are now in a stronger position to monitor social life and compli-
ance with party policies than before, thanks to their increased institutional capacity 
and a higher legitimacy among their members. An INGO official, asked to provide an 
illustration of how MOs are still agents of control on behalf of the state, mentioned the 
role of the VWU as implementers and enforcers of family planning policies.126 Local 
cadres of the VWU are regularly involved in family planning campaigns in coopera-
tion with the Demographic Agency.127 Thanks to its control of the territory, the VWU 
is the only institution able to know what families comply with state regulations. When 
a breach of the law is detected, the VWU typically  reports it to local authorities and 
calls for restrictive action. In other cases, non-complying households are excluded 
from the provision of social services delivered by the VWU. The already  mentioned 
microcredit project  in Quang Ngai province is another instance of MOs acting as state 
agents. The INGO involved in the project  concluded that the local CYU branch was 
nothing but “the umbrella body for service teams to sedentarize minorities” though 
91
125 MOs do levy membership fees, but they are usually minimal,  especially in less developed areas, and 
they only manage to cover a small share of MOs actiities (Sakata 2006:55).
126 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 21/08/08.
127 See Pesce (2007) for some examples.
measures such as a compulsory cultivation program (CARE International 2001:44). 
Finally, the participation of MOs to election processes at different levels of govern-
ment (see 4.2.3) is another example of their contribution in a particularly  sensitive 
area. The VFF is in charge of endorsing candidates independent  from the VCP for par-
ticipation to elections. This can be considered as a sort of cooptation, whereby poten-
tial political leaders independent from the party are absorbed in the part-state system.
The MOs role as social control agencies is thus closely  linked to their function of im-
plementers of state policies, a task for which MOs are now as fundamental as they 
were before doi moi. According to my respondents, the exceptional contribution that 
MOs are able to deliver in implementation is mostly due to their outstanding commu-
nication network.128 Some interviewees claimed that  often there is no other available 
partner than MOs able to make sure that communication reaches the end users of their 
services. This is particularly the case of rural areas, where the MOs communication 
system, centered upon the commune level, is an unmatched channel to communicate 
with the target groups of development projects.  For example, one interviewee129 men-
tioned that  the VWU is able to start a very effective “cascade communication” proc-
ess, leveraging on the role of women (most of whom are VWU members in rural ar-
eas) to access every household. Another INGO official130 reported an episode that  il-
lustrates how much more effective communication can be when initiated by MOs 
rather than by  local authorities. The INGOs were working at  a project to provide every 
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128  An example of the importance of MOs as communication agents, reported by a respondent in an 
interview carried out in Hanoi on 07/08/08, is that the VWU is still Vietnam’s largest publisher. Differ-
ently from the past,  however, the content of publications now deals with development issues like 
healthcare rather than on political and ideological matters.
129 Interviewed carried out in Hanoi, 19/08/08.
130 Interviewed carried out in Hanoi, 25/08/08.
household in a few northern villages with mosquito nets to prevent the spread of ma-
laria. After several months of unsuccessful attempts by  Health Ministry officials in 
one village, the INGOs proposed members of the local Veterans’ Association (a MO 
affiliated to the VFF) to take part to the project. Old war veterans enjoyed high levels 
of respect in the village, and when they  started to roam the village, speaking person-
ally to members of each family, people listened to them carefully, differently from 
what they did when government functionaries visited them. Within a couple of weeks, 
most households in the village were using anti-mosquito nets. This example shows 
that the Vietnamese state can rely on institutional structures additional to those of fully 
governmental bodies, and capitalize on the higher legitimacy  that such institutions 
(MOs) enjoy among rural populations. 
5.2.3 Party dependence
As far as the crucial issue of the relationship between MOs and the VCP is concerned, 
I have found a high level of agreement among the interviewees. Most INGO officials 
said that, according to their professional experience, MOs enjoy substantial opera-
tional independence from the VCP. To be sure, during the design and the implementa-
tion of development projects, members of the local chapters of the party  or the Peo-
ple’s Committees are always consulted. However, it is very rare that such actors man-
age to have some influence on the defining specifications of the project  itself, not least 
because of their low interest and understanding of development activities in general. 
Some INGOs officials stated that, as long as their operational activities are concerned, 
MOs are almost completely free from the interference of the party or local 
authorities.131 Some others, however, qualify their view on the operational dependence 
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131 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 13/08/08.
of MOs by mentioning two cases where a more “hands-on” approach from the party-
state may occur. The first case is that of projects including sensitive policy areas such 
as religion, ethnicity, and human rights.132 The second circumstance is that of projects 
whose implementation may interfere with strong economic interests. In such cases, 
one interviewee argued,133 it is possible that the voice of MOs may be unheard by  lo-
cal authorities.
In spite of such operational independence, none of the respondents would describe 
MOs as institutions fully  independent from the state. The autonomy MOs enjoy in 
formulating and running their development projects takes place within clear bounda-
ries set up by the party.  Some of the reasons mentioned by  my interviewees have al-
ready  been analyzed in this thesis. For example, the fact that the government funds 
most of the budget of MOs allows the state to give general directions on how such or-
ganizations should be managed. Some respondents also recall the direct participation 
of the VCP in executive committees within MOs (see 4.2.2). With regard to develop-
ment projects specifically, all interviewees agree that, in case of conflicts, MOs offi-
cials are not allowed to maintain a confrontational stance vis-à-vis the party-state. 
This means, for example, that public questioning of the conduct of a state official in 
the policy area of the project is not possible, even if their behavior is in clear contrast 
with the interests of the MO constituency. More generally, MOs are not allowed to 
critique in public existing laws, or to advocate among their members specific changes 
to current policies or regulations. Not surprisingly, even less tolerated is MOs’ activ-
ism in advocating political reform.
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132  The example of the Women’s Caravan project,  however, suggests that such projects, although more 
difficult to implement, are still possible if local authorities can be convinced that they will not pose a 
threat to political stability.
133 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 25/08/08.
The limited degree of independence from the party-state that MOs enjoy should not be 
mistaken as a sign of inability to influence policy-makers. Indeed, some of the inter-
viewees have pointed out that, through methods very different from those employed 
by pressure groups in democracies,134 MOs have considerable capacity to orientate the 
action of public authorities. This ability has its roots, perhaps paradoxically, in the 
very same function of social control agents that the VCP has designed for MOs. MOs 
monitor Vietnamese society  precisely because of their status of privileged “transmis-
sion belts” between social sectors and the state. As one INGO official notices, this 
gives them an extraordinary leverage compared to Vietnamese NGOs.135 For example, 
they  can complain and access party official and local authorities on behalf of their 
members. They  can consult their members about the implementation of policies and 
report to local authorities any shortcomings or attitudes about possible amendments. 
These processes are possible not only because of the legal status of MOs, but also be-
cause MOs officials entertain personal connections with those in power in state bod-
ies, and dispose of a thorough knowledge of how state and party  agencies work. Fur-
thermore, they can access and monitor a wide range of issues, such as conditions at 
the workplace and household life, which for everybody else are off-limits. This en-
ables them to engage the state, even though in a non-adversarial way, as civil society 
organizations in Vietnam cannot do. 
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134 Most importantly,  public confrontation (an important element of state-society relations in democratic 
systems) is absent in MOs-state dynamics.
135 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 21/08/08.
Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks
This study has elaborated on the theoretical framework of institutional change pre-
sented in the introduction, it has contextualized it with reference to contemporary 
Vietnamese history, and it has reviewed the six research hypotheses formulated. 
Within the limits of the research design discussed, the development projects analyzed, 
the fieldwork in Hanoi and the literature review have provided sufficient empirical 
evidence to corroborate all of them. 
MOs have been successfully turned into the bridge between state and society that the 
VCP had envisioned, into a distinctive mélange of genuine political participation and 
tight authoritarian supervision. As the first chapter argued, this was a winning strategy 
to rejuvenate the legitimacy of the VCP in a period of potential social and political 
instability.  The empowerment of MOs as welfare service providers and participation 
forums has dramatically increased their legitimacy among their memberships. MOs 
chapters are now perceived by their members and foreign actors as markedly different 
from other local state actors, due to their commitment to the social base they represent 
and their relatively higher efficiency. However, MOs remain without doubt an organic 
part of the Vietnamese one-party political system, a polity they contribute to 
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strengthen by addressing needs and demands that other state agencies are neglecting. 
Such a surplus of legitimacy, rather than being captured by potentially  destabilizing 
actors independent  from the party-state, is being channelled within institutions tightly 
controlled by the party and transferred to the political system as a whole, thus rein-
forcing the process of its own perpetuation. 
Section 1.4.3 has already made clear that the limitations of the research design 
adopted in this study do not allow drawing conclusive generalizations on the topics 
analyzed. To overcome such limitations, my thesis project should be expanded in sev-
eral directions. For example, further research is needed to assess the role of MOs that 
are only  marginally present in the politics of development, and whose contribution in 
other political arenas may point to different  patterns of state-society  relations (state-
labor relations could be a particularly important  arena at this regard). Furthermore, a 
study of legitimacy is not complete without surveying comprehensively  the local 
communities, who are in last analysis the depositor of legitimacy legacies. The “dis-
aggregation of the state” should also be pursued with a more rigorous approach, in 
order to account for the coexistence of different patterns of legitimacy and state-
society relations. However, despite the limitations of the research plan, the hypotheses 
confirmed by this study offer valuable insights that can be contextualized within the 
academic issues introduced throughout this thesis. Some of these debates pertain to 
Vietnamese politics specifically, such as the discussion about the state capacity in this 
country. Some others, on the other hand, also belong to overarching questions about 
the study of state-society relations, legitimacy, development and democratization. 
The first  issue to which our conclusions are relevant is the debate about the capacity 
of the Vietnamese state vis-à-vis social actors. Is Vietnam a “strong state” or does it 
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have to be “accommodating” due to its limited capacity? The results of our study  point 
to the persistence of a position of dominance of the state over social forces throughout 
the doi moi period. This applies, at least, to the social groups participating in rural de-
velopment projects such as those we analyzed, most prominently the poorest strata of 
the population, women, peasants, and the young. For such sectors of Vietnamese soci-
ety, doi moi and MOs reform have brought about a significant change in how they  re-
late to the state, giving them unprecedented (if limited) opportunities to take part to 
political processes and influence state action. However, such an expansion of political 
participation has taken place within the strict boundaries set out by the party  state. 
Criticism of the monopolistic political power exerted by  the VCP is never allowed in 
public venues, and among the social sectors we have studied such critical demands 
have not materialized yet. Given the evidence at our disposal, it is fair to conclude that 
state-society relations in the politics of development have evolved exactly along the 
lines envisaged by  the party  state, contributing to the consolidation of its social con-
trol in remote areas. For this reason, “accommodating” arrangements are to be consid-
ered functional to the VCP strategy of fostering its legitimacy  to maintain the funda-
mental features of the political system unaltered.
Secondly, our results allow a few remarks about Vietnam’s mobilizational-corporatist 
system and its relationship with political legitimacy. The VCP has attempted to 
strengthen the Vietnamese mobilizational system, identifying it as the cornerstone of 
its strategy to consolidate the legitimacy of its authoritarian rule. The success of this 
strategy is important for two reasons. The first one is that the “state-led” model of 
civil society  has been reasserted among rural masses, which have always constituted a 
key constituency for political elites Socialist Vietnam. An old system, only partially 
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renovated, has proved its effectiveness in regulating state-society  relations in times of 
radical social and economic change. The second is that the VCP’s attempt to extend 
this system to other social groups such as urban-based business and professional asso-
ciations is indicative of the potential of corporatism to co-opt new actors in authoritar-
ian regimes. This has important implications for the more general issue of legitimacy 
in authoritarian polities and its relationship with institutional change. The contained 
institutional change initiated by the VCP has given a decisive contribution to address a 
legitimacy  crisis that we have defined as both rational and performance-related. The 
success of the state response to such a crisis, in turn, has reduced the potential for the 
emergence of social tensions and more radical demands of political change and de-
mocratization.
Thirdly, the research results can be related to the ongoing debate about the emergence 
of civil society  in Vietnam, and to more general issues of the definition of civil society 
and its emergence in underdeveloped countries. Our research suggests a rather bleak 
outlook for the prospects of civil society  in Vietnam as understood in the Western po-
litical discourse. On one hand, the centrality of the mobilizational system outlined in 
the above paragraph parallels an overall limited ability of civil society  actors inde-
pendent form the state to have a significant impact on policy making. The disparity 
between genuine civil society organization and state-led or state-inspired ones in 
terms of their ability  to mobilize political and social resources is impressive. Conse-
quently, local NGOs present much more limited capacity  to access and influence gov-
ernment officials as compared with MOs and similar institutions. On the other hand, 
although existing civil society actors in Vietnam have a remarkable record in deliver-
ing effective social services, their role as critical agents of political change is largely 
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disappointing at least in the policy  domain we have studied. Critics of Western con-
cepts of civil society  may argue that indeed there is no reason why social develop-
ments in Western countries should replicate in other cultures. However, a definition of 
civil society  that arbitrarily  excludes its crucial role of critical actor vis-à-vis the state 
is equally problematic. Should MOs be considered as a part (perhaps even the most 
vital and significant) of Vietnamese civil society? An affirmative answer to this ques-
tion, considered their subordination to the VCP, would imply an excessive stretch of 
the concept  of civil society as it is used in the current academic debate. However, 
dismissing their role as mere venues for the stage of a meaningless form of participa-
tion would be equally misleading. 
Other considerations can be made departing from our hypotheses with regard to the 
study of state-society relations as a paradigm to understand political change. The first 
is that the process of “disaggregation of the state” advocated by many is an ineludible 
step to understand the dynamic reality of state-society interactions. Our research con-
firms that the state in Vietnam is a complex apparatus of a number of agencies that 
often cannot be treated as a single, homogeneous actor. Such agencies relate to the 
general population and to specific social groups differently, according to different pat-
terns of interaction and legitimation modes. The higher goodwill that MOs enjoy 
among the rural population in comparison with other state agencies is a fitting exam-
ple to this point. 136 The empirical material we have gathered shows that even the issue 
of MOs autonomy from other state and party actors is more controversial than it may 
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136  At this regard, Thawnhhmung’s work (2004) comes to mind. Among the Vietnamese, we can ob-
serve low levels of legitimacy towards some state organs (most frequently, in the case studies analyzed, 
this is the case of local authorities and local party chapters).  However, the presence of some other agen-
cies (such as MOs) that enjoy greater levels of political legitimacy compensates such legitimacy defi-
ciencies, preventing the escalation of a full-blown legitimacy crisis of the state. This is reminiscent of 
Thawnhhmung’s argument about the coexistence of different levels of state legitimacy in Myanmar. 
seem at a first look, and that it is essential to distinguish between different  agencies 
for an accurate analysis. The second consideration touches upon the issue of the de-
marcation between the state and society. Vietnam’s MOs are a particularly interesting 
example to illustrate how challenging such a discrimination may be. As shown above, 
the extent to which the status of “civil society  actors” can be attributed to Vietnamese 
MOs is highly debatable. Rather than a straightforward distinction between state and 
society, what we see in the politics of development in Vietnam are porous boundaries, 
and a continuum where hybrid structures mediate among a plurality of interests and 
demands arising from both state and non-state actors. A picture reminiscent of the cri-
tique of statist approaches introduced in chapter four.
Finally, we can return to the unresolved, long-standing issue of the nexus between so-
cioeconomic advancement and democratization. The results of this research can offer 
a partial explanation of how an authoritarian polity  can coexist with high levels of 
economic growth, and more broadly  with development. This is possible, we have ar-
gued throughout the paper, when the political elites manage to adapt the institutional 
environment of such a political system to the changing needs arising from social and 
economic change. Such an evolution is crucial to maintain level of legitimacy suffi-
cient to induce the population to commit to a sufficient extent to the persistence of the 
authoritarian polity. From this angle, if this institutional adaptation is successful, the 
constitution of a democratic political system is unnecessary to promote development 
and socio-political stability. Conversely, the advancement of the social condition of 
large strata of the population is a process that can take place in the absence of the ar-
ticulation of a powerful democratic critique of the political status quo. This suggests 
that a contextualization of the relationship between development and democracy is 
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necessary, and that contingent political, historical and cultural factors are of central 
significance for this link rather than just marginal phenomena. Furthermore, the de-
velopment projects we have analyzed are examples of good governance achieved 
within an environment that by Western standards we could well describe as undemo-
cratic and deprived of civil society  actors. This opens a series of pivotal questions 
about the desirability  of democracy  and civil society  development to attain develop-
mental goals in developing countries. Moreover, the importance socioeconomic de-
velopment and of a thriving civil society  for democratic transitions and good govern-
ance practices could equally be reconsidered. This is a crucial aspect where the Viet-
namese case could be particularly revealing for the practical approach adopted by for-
eign donors and NGOs, and specifically  for their drive to manufacture civil society 
(and consequently  democracy) from the outside--an ambitious aim, which perhaps is 
not as crucial as many believe. 
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